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The IRS is still reeling from accusations that it “targeted” Tea Party and other 
non-profit organizations.  Although multiple government investigations found no 
politically motivated behavior—only mismanagement—Congressional hearings were quite 
inflammatory.  Congress recently followed up those hearings with a set of IRS reforms.  
Congress’s approach is reminiscent of the late 1990s, when highly publicized 
Congressional hearings regarding alleged abuses by the IRS resulted in a major IRS 
reform and restructuring, although the allegations subsequently were largely debunked.  
This Article argues that the recent allegations against the IRS also were overblown.  It 
looks to the aftermath of the 1998 IRS reform, which included a major downturn in 
enforcement, for lessons for the present day.  The Article concludes that Congress as a 
whole can do a better job of keeping politics from undermining tax administration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently experienced a major public 
humiliation, stemming from allegations, beginning in 2013, that it targeted Tea Party and 
other conservative non-profit organizations.  The report that prompted the controversy, 
issued by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), found that the 
IRS delayed approval of Tea Party and other conservative groups’ applications for a 
determination of tax-exempt status under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 501(c)(4).1  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)2 and Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted 
criminal investigations and eventually found mismanagement but no criminal activity.3  It 
turns out that the IRS also scrutinized and delayed the applications of some progressive 
groups.4  Yet the message many taxpayers heard was that the IRS “targeted” conservative 
groups.5 
Perhaps the worst part of the controversy for tax administration was the highly 
publicized hearings at least four Congressional committees held.6  Congress’s approach to 
the investigation was quite partisan.7  The House Committee on Oversight and Government 
                                                      
1 A May 2013 report of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found that 
“[t]he IRS used inappropriate criteria that identified for review Tea Party and other organizations applying 
for tax-exempt status based upon their names or policy positions instead of indications of potential political 
campaign intervention.”  TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO 
IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW i (2013), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports 
/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7MN-XYJ9] [hereinafter 2013 TIGTA REPORT].  TIGTA’s 
report did not use the word “target,” but others did, including some Congress members.  See Sandy 
Fitzgerald, Rep. Issa: Conservative, Tea Party Groups Still Targeted for Scrutiny, NEWSMAX (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Darrell-Issa-tea-party-IRS-Lois-Lerner/2015/07/24/id/658797 [https:// 
perma.cc/LF99-4KYP]. 
2 See Kevin Johnson & Gregory Korte, FBI to Investigate Tea Party Tax Affair, USA TODAY (May 
14, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/05/14/irs-tea-partyinvestigation/2158899 
[https://perma.cc/E72Q-GTBM]. 
3 See Devlin Barrett, Criminal Charges Not Expected in IRS Probe, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303819704579318983271821584 [https://perma.cc/9JQR-
2LMB] (noting that the FBI announced that it did not plan to file charges because it found only 
mismanagement, not criminal behavior); Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Legis. Affairs to the Hon. 
Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (Oct. 23, 2015), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources 
/documents/IRS1023.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9CS-ZH8Q] [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Just., Letter to the Hon. 
Bob Goodlatte].  (“We found no evidence that any IRS official acted based on political, discriminatory, 
corrupt, or other inappropriate motives that would support a criminal prosecution.”).  The Senate Finance 
Committee’s bipartisan investigation found numerous instances of IRS mismanagement.  See S. REP. NO. 
114-119 (2015), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CRPT-114srpt119-pt1.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/YPV5-9BQ5]. 
4 See S. REP. NO. 114-119, at 255 (2015); see also infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
5 See Stephen Dinan, Tea Party Targeting Accusations, Legal Issues Persist for IRS After Justice 
Ends Probe, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/25/irs-tea-party-
targeting-accusations-legal-issues-p/?page=all [https://perma.cc/7589-X5H5] (“‘The American people 
deserve better than this.  Despite the DOJ closing its investigation, the Ways and Means Committee will 
continue to find answers and hold the IRS accountable for its actions,’ said [Rep. Paul] Ryan . . . .”). 
6 See Josh Hicks, Five and Counting: Yet Another IRS Hearing, WASH. POST (June 4, 2013), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/04/five-and-counting-yet-another-irs-hearing 
[https://perma.cc/9GNV-BJFA].  The committees included “the Senate Finance Committee, the House Ways 
and Means Committee, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government.”  Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea 
Party Controversy and Administrative Discretion, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 41A, 42A n.8 (2013). 
7 See Tom Cohen, Partisan Views of IRS Targeting: Political Conspiracy or Overzealous Scrutiny, 
CNN (Jun. 4, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/04/politics/irs-targeting/ [https://perma.cc/4VA8-SBF5] 
(“Like a partisan version of the proverbial blind men touching the elephant, members of Congress have 
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Reform hearings were particularly negative in tone8 and have been dubbed “witch hunts” 
by some observers.9 
Congress followed up the hearings with legislation.  The Protecting Americans 
from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015, enacted in December, included a set of provisions 
entitled “Internal Revenue Service Reforms.”10  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2016, of which PATH is a part,11 contained other restrictions on the IRS.12 
Reform following scandalizing Congressional hearings is all too familiar for the 
IRS.  The last major IRS reform occurred in 1998, the product of the Internal Revenue 
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (IRS Reform Act).13  That reform followed 
Congressional hearings that were similar in tone to the hearings that began in 2013.  The 
1990s hearings accused IRS collections agents of abusive behavior. 14   The General 
Accounting Office (GAO) 15  ultimately found many of the witnesses’ horror stories 
unfounded or exaggerated.16  However, that was after Congress enacted sweeping changes 
in the IRS Reform Act,17  including restricting collection actions in various ways and 
requiring a major structural reorganization that diverted significant resources from 
enforcement.18 
                                                      
starkly differing views of the scope and magnitude of the Internal Revenue Service targeting of conservative 
groups seeking tax-exempt status that dominates headlines and committee hearings.”); Elijah E. Cummings & 
Sander M. Levin, Editorial, Reform the IRS, But Leave Politics Out of It, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2013), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reform-the-irs-but-leave-politics-out-of-it/2013/08/12/64c5d36c-0362-
11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html [https://perma.cc/9BWB-RXLJ] (editorial in the Washington Post by the 
ranking Democrats on the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the House Ways and 
Means Committee, stating, in part, “For nearly three months, Republicans have engaged in a sustained and 
orchestrated campaign to accuse the White House and the Obama administration of using the IRS to target 
the president’s political enemies—without any evidence to support their claims.”). 
8 At one low point, “House Oversight and Government Reform Chairman Darrell Issa, R-Calif., cut 
off Rep. Elijah E. Cummings’ microphone and adjourned [the] morning’s hearing on the IRS while 
Cummings was still speaking . . . .”  Steven T. Dennis, Issa Cuts Off Cummings at IRS Hearing, ROLL CALL 
(Mar. 5, 2014), http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/issa-cuts-off-cummings [https://perma.cc/6TGK-9T4L]. 
9 See Kahng, supra note 6, at 43 n.13 (“Circus ringmaster Darrell Issa’s relentless attacks on the 
IRS and willful ignorance of any facts that might undermine his witch hunt have been truly impressive.”); 
Rebekah Metzler, Democrats Accuse Rep. Darrell Issa of McCarthyism During Panel Vote on Lerner, U.S. 
NEWS (Jun. 28, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/06/28/democrats-accuse-rep-darrel-issa-
of-mccarthyism-during-panel-vote-on-lerner [https://perma.cc/9X4G-4CPG] (“Democrats said they were sick 
of Issa’s ‘witch hunts’ and ‘McCarthy-ite’ tactics . . . .”). 
10 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, tit. IV, subtit. 
A, https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr2029/BILLS-114hr2029enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUX5-8E7T]. 
11 See Pub. L. No. 114-113. 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 282–283. 
13 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 
685. 
14 See Senate Panel Hears Stories of Alleged IRS Abuses, CNN (Apr. 28, 1998), http://www.cnn 
.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/04/28/irs.hearings [https://perma.cc/X3X3-2RQD]. 
15 In 2004, the GAO was renamed the Government Accountability Office.  Our Name, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/namechange.html [https://perma.cc/YLE5-RUDE]. 
16 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD 99-82, GAO REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF IRS TAXPAYER 
ABUSE (1999).  The Webster Commission similarly found “there was no pattern of misuse by the CID of 
search warrants, grand juries, informants, or undercover operators, although there were ‘one or two isolated 
abuses.’”  Joe Spellman, Conference Panel Ponders Finance Hearing Horror Stories, 83 TAX NOTES 1854, 
1855 (1999). 
17 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 
685. 
18 See infra notes 244–247 and accompanying text.  One commentator analogized the 1998 
reorganization as akin to “trying to change a jet engine on a plane as it is flying over the ocean.”  
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Unlike the 1998 IRS reform, the 2015 reforms occurred after a full investigation—
not only by the FBI and DOJ, but also a follow-up investigation by TIGTA.19  Yet, although 
all three investigations reached positive conclusions for the IRS, Congress legislated 
“reforms” in the areas that were the subject of hearings.  The 2015 reforms were nowhere 
near as sweeping as the large-scale IRS restructuring Congress mandated in 1998, but there 
could be calls for such a major IRS reform, particularly if current anti-IRS sentiment 
continues.20 
The 1998 IRS reform took a major toll on tax enforcement activity.21  Minimal 
enforcement does not help narrow the “tax gap”—the gap between taxes due and taxes 
collected.22  The tax gap for the most recent year the IRS estimated it, 2006, was $450 
billion before enforcement actions and $385 billion after late payments and enforced 
collections.23   Enforcement is needed both for direct collection of taxes—such as the 
enforced collections portion of the $65 billion the IRS collected after the due date for 
2006—but also for the indirect or “shadow” effect it has on compliance.24  Moreover, 
reduced enforcement primarily benefits those with greater opportunity to evade taxes—not 
those who receive income from visible sources such as employment and interest on bank 
accounts25—and provides greater benefits to those who have more tax liability to evade.  
                                                      
Modernization Update: New IRS Up and Running, J. ACCT. (Feb. 29, 2000), http://www 
.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2000/mar/modernizationupdatenewirsupandrunning.html [https://perma.cc 
/TYQ6-BD26]. 
19 See TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., STATUS OF ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE 
PROCESSING OF TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS INVOLVING POLITICAL CAMPAIGN INTERVENTION (Mar. 27, 2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2015reports/201510025fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UPW-7T7G] 
[hereinafter TIGTA, STATUS OF ACTIONS TAKEN]. 
20 See Most View the CDC Favorably; VA’s Image Slips, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2015), http:// 
www.people-press.org/2015/01/22/most-view-the-cdc-favorably-vas-image-slips [https://perma.cc/DC6B-
LJZM] (“The IRS is the lowest rated federal agency included in the survey.  Overall, 45% hold a favorable 
view of the IRS, while about as many (48%) say they have an unfavorable view of the agency.  Attitudes 
toward the IRS have changed little over the past several years.”). 
21 See infra text accompanying note 240 (reporting several enforcement statistics for fiscal years 
1994 through 2005). 
22 See Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 25, 25 (2007) (“No government can . . . rely on taxpayers’ sense of duty to remit what is 
owed. . . . Over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink, as they see how they are being taken advantage of by 
the others.”). 
23 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP “MAP” TAX YEAR 2006 (Dec. 2011), https://www.irs 
.gov/pub/irs-soi/06rastg12map.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HWD-QUWW]. 
24 The Treasury estimates a 6:1 return on investment in IRS enforcement.  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
DEPARTMENTAL OFFICES 1035, https://timedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/tre.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/K64G-B78U].  An econometric study by an IRS employee estimated the indirect effect of a dollar spent on 
enforcement at over eleven times the direct effect.  See Alan H. Plumley, The Impact of the IRS on Voluntary 
Tax Compliance: Preliminary Empirical Results ¶ 19 (Nov. 14, 2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 224-22 (IRS paper 
presented at the National Tax Association 95th Annual Conference on Taxation) (“The average indirect effect 
of . . . audits started in 1991 was about 11.7 times as large as the average adjustment directly proposed by 
audits closed that year.”).  Cf. Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., The Effect of Audit Rate on the Federal Individual 
Income Tax, 1977–1986, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 395, 405 (1990) (finding that that the indirect effect of audits is 
responsible for six out of every seven dollars of tax revenue). 
25 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX YEAR 2001 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX UNDERREPORTING GAP 
(2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_gap_update_070212.pdf [https://perma.cc/C33H-VU9S] 
(estimating 98.8% reporting of amounts subject to substantial information reporting and withholding—wages 
and salaries—and 95.5% reporting of amounts subject to substantial information reporting, such as interest 
and dividend income, compared to 46.1% estimated reporting of amounts subject to little or no information 
reporting, such as self-employment income).  The reason for these stark differences in underreporting levels 
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That is, in general, reduced tax enforcement likely is regressive.26  Accordingly, we should 
proceed with caution before tying the hands of the IRS. 
Government agencies, such as the IRS, certainly need supervision and to be held 
accountable for their actions.27  However, agencies can receive “too much supervision or 
supervision of the wrong kind,”28 which can actually be destructive.29  Excessive oversight, 
like excessive disclosure, is not costless.30  Congressional investigations into the IRS are 
enormously costly—not just in terms of taxpayer money,31  but also in terms of both 
personnel time 32  at an already overextended agency 33  and IRS employee morale. 34  
                                                      
likely is the opportunity to evade taxes on amounts not reported to the IRS.  Leandra Lederman, Statutory 
Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697–98 (2007). 
26 See Leandra Lederman, The IRS, Politics, and Income Inequality, 150 TAX NOTES 1329, 1332 
(2016). 
27 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1840 (2015) 
(“The central importance of supervision should not come as a surprise.”).  The IRS receives constant 
supervision from numerous oversight bodies.  See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
28 Metzger, supra note 27, at 1839. 
29 See id. (providing examples of “managerial and supervisory failure” and stating that “[m]ost 
commonly, the problem is too little supervision, but sometimes the concern is too much supervision or 
supervision of the wrong kind.”). 
30 See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW 169 (2014) 
(“Mandated disclosure is not harmless if its costs outweigh its benefits.”); see also Joshua D. Blank, 
Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629, 1632 (2009) (“The 
overdisclosure response poses serious threats to tax administration. . . . [The] distraction [of disclosure of 
non-abusive transactions] slows the IRS’s investigations of truly abusive transactions, delaying statutory 
responses to tax avoidance strategies.”). 
31 See Written Testimony of IRS Commissioner John A. Koskinen Before the House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee on IRS Operations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www 
.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Written-Testimony-of-Commissioner-Koskinen-before-the-House-Oversight-and-
Government-Reform-Committee-on-IRS-Operations [https://perma.cc/RRJ7-7K8T] [hereinafter Koskinen 
March 2014 Testimony] (stating that the personnel costs of complying with Committee requests over the 
preceding eight months amounted to nearly $8 million, in addition to a comparable amount spent on 
supporting information-technology infrastructure); Press Release, New IRS Inspector General Report Finds 
No Evidence That Lerner Intentionally Crashed Computer or Concealed Emails from Investigators, COMM. 
ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM (July 2, 2015), http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases 
/new-irs-inspector-general-report-finds-no-evidence-that-lerner-intentionally [https://perma.cc/4APV-V5AD] 
(quoting Rep. Elijah E. Cummings as stating, “After spending more than $20 million and three years 
investigating, the Inspector General’s conclusions remain the same: there is no evidence to substantiate 
Republican claims of political motivation, White House involvement, or intentional destruction of 
evidence.”). 
32 IRS Commissioner John Koskinen testified in 2014 that “[o]ver the last 8 months, the IRS has 
devoted significant resources to this committee's investigation and requests for information, as well as those 
of other congressional committees.  More than 250 IRS employees have spent nearly 100,000 hours working 
directly on complying with the investigations . . . .”  Koskinen March 2014 Testimony, supra note 31. 
33 In recent years, Congress has required the IRS to do more (such as administer the ACA) with 
less.  See infra note 301 and accompanying text. 
34 See George Guttman, News Analysis—Evaluating the IRS: The Senate Finance Hearings in 
Retrospect, 77 TAX NOTES 13, 13 (1997) (describing the three days of hearings by the Senate Finance 
Committee as “both unusual and traumatic” and “deeply embarrassing to the IRS”); Pete Kasperowicz, The 
Next Big Problem at the IRS: Low Worker Morale, THE BLAZE (July 23, 2013), http://www.theblaze.com 
/stories/2014/07/23/the-next-big-problem-at-the-irs-low-worker-morale [https://perma.cc/9WDK-U6X5] 
(noting that IRS Commissioner John Koskinen testified that “ongoing investigations by Congress into the 
IRS targeting scandal are having the effect of lowering morale at the tax-collection agency.”). 
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Excessive oversight can make IRS managers and other employees reluctant to take risks35 
and lower-level employees reluctant to report problems to managers.36 
The tone of Congressional investigations may also affect the public’s perception 
of the fairness of the federal tax system.37  The federal income tax system relies in part on 
taxpayer self-reports, and citizens may be more likely to comply with legal authorities they 
view as legitimate.38 
Accordingly, this Article turns the spotlight to Congress’s treatment of the IRS, 
comparing the recent IRS hearings with the ones Congress conducted leading up to the 
1998 IRS reform.  Part II of the Article analyzes the 501(c)(4) controversy that is a principal 
factor in the IRS’s current relationship with Congress.  This Part examines the facts behind 
the headlines and argues that the controversy was much more banal than it often was 
portrayed in the media and by some in Congress.  Next, Part III turns to the 1998 IRS 
reform.  It explains that that the controversy that led to that reform similarly was not the 
scandal portrayed by Congress and the media. 
Part IV considers each of these two IRS reforms as controversy-driven reforms.  It 
first looks at the 1998 IRS reform and examines the negative effects that reform had on 
IRS collection activity.  It then turns to the IRS reforms Congress enacted in 2015, briefly 
addressing how they relate to the 2013 IRS controversy.  Finally, this Part looks at the costs 
of politicizing the IRS and argues that Congress’s approach to the IRS needs reform. 
II. THE 2013 IRS CONTROVERSY 
The most recent IRS controversy focused primarily39 on whether the IRS delayed 
granting determination letters to Tea Party and other conservative organizations requesting 
                                                      
35 Barry Bozeman reported that Commissioner Charles Rossotti told him in an interview that 
because of oversight of the IRS, “[w]e live in a fishbowl.  It is difficult to make even a small mistake because 
it instantly gets magnified.”  BARRY BOZEMAN, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, GOVERNMENT 
MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION MEGA-TECHNOLOGY: LESSONS FROM THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE’S TAX 
SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION 24 (Mar. 2002), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files 
/BozemanReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/39N8-SVMM] (explaining that much of the funding went into 
software and hardware the IRS was still using in 2002, and some of the funds went into renovating buildings) 
[hereinafter BOZEMAN, INFORMATION MEGA-TECHNOLOGY].  Bozeman also notes that an employee blamed 
Congress’s oversight of the agency for part of the employees’ fear of taking risks.  Barry Bozeman, Risk, 
Reform and Organizational Culture: The Case of IRS Tax Systems Modernization, 6 INT’L PUB. MGMT. J. 
117, 131 (2003) [hereinafter Bozeman, Organizational Culture]. 
36 See Bozeman, Organizational Culture, supra note 35, at 129; see also id. at 133 ([E]mployees 
“‘think they will get shot if they say their project has a problem . . . .’”) (quoting an anonymous IRS 
employee). 
37 See Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. 971, 1010 
(2003). 
38 Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About 
Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 722–24 (2000).  Even if negative taxpayer views of the IRS do not reduce tax 
compliance, restrictions on the IRS’s ability to enforce the laws—whether through budget cuts or 
otherwise—likely will have that effect.  See Leonard E. Burman & Joel Slemrod, The IRS Scandal and Tax 
Compliance, OUPBLOG (May 30, 2013), http://blog.oup.com/2013/05/irs-scandal-tax-compliance-nonprofit 
[https://perma.cc/7L2V-3WCA]. 
39 In the same month that it released its report on the 501(c)(4) issue, TIGTA found that the IRS 
had spent too much money on conferences and on training videos that included a Gilligan’s Island parody, a 
Star Trek parody, and IRS employees learning the “Cupid Shuffle.”  TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX 
ADMIN., REVIEW OF THE AUGUST 2010 SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISION’S CONFERENCE IN 
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA (2013) [hereinafter TIGTA, REVIEW OF SB/SE CONFERENCE], http://oversight.house 
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/201310037fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM79-TPPA]; see also Paul Caron, The 
Complete IRS Video Collection, TAXPROF BLOG (June 10, 2013), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog 
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a determination of tax-exempt status under Code section 501(c)(4).  The controversy 
erupted in seemingly the least likely of venues: a meeting of the Tax Section of the 
American Bar Association.  Lois Lerner, then-Director of the IRS’s Exempt Organizations 
Division, apparently acting at the direction of then-Acting IRS Commissioner Steven 
Miller,40 planted a question that she answered after prepared remarks at the Tax Section’s 
Exempt Organizations Committee meeting on May 10, 2013.41  IRS leadership had seen 
TIGTA’s draft report on its investigation of alleged targeting of certain non-profit 
organizations and apparently wanted to get out ahead of it.42  Of course, this approach 
quickly backfired.43 
TIGTA issued its report four days later.44  The fallout was fast and furious.  The 
same day, President Obama directed the Secretary of Treasury to request the resignation of 
Steven Miller; Miller complied the next day.45  Lois Lerner refused to resign and was put 
on paid administrative leave for several months, but announced her retirement in 
                                                      
/2013/06/the-complete.html [https://perma.cc/SR9C-7NMJ] (also linking a Mad Men-themed training video).  
This issue did not get nearly the same amount of attention as the 501(c)(4) issue.  Gutfield: Small 
Government Is Back, FOX NEWS (June 6, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2013/06/06/gutfeld-
small-government-back [https://perma.cc/K4WG-6ALU] (“IRS targeting groups.  It’s a much bigger issue 
than some silly video.”).  However, in recent appropriations bills, Congress restricted the IRS use of funds for 
videos.  See infra notes 282–283 and accompanying text. 
40 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIG., COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOV’T 
AFFAIRS, IRS & TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES RELATED TO 501(C)(4) APPLICANTS ENGAGED IN CAMPAIGN 
ACTIVITY 6 (Sept. 5, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/.m/files/senate-democrats.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JLC-
JAJG] [hereinafter U.S. SENATE, IRS & TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES] (stating that “[a]t the Acting 
Commissioner’s direction and in response to a planted question, Ms. Lerner apologized for the IRS’ having 
used ‘Tea Party’ to identify 501(c)(4) applications subject to heightened review.”).  The IRS apparently had 
considered having Lerner make a statement at a conference at Georgetown Law Center in April 2013.  
Darrell Issa, Chairman, Lois Lerner’s Involvement in the IRS Targeting of Tax-Exempt Organizations App. 4 
at 43–44 (Mar. 11, 2014), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Lerner-Report1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZS79-UXRR] [hereinafter Darrell Issa, Chairman, Lois Lerner’s Involvement]. 
41 Abby Phillip, IRS Planted Question About Tax Exempt Groups, ABC NEWS (May 17, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/05/irs-planted-question-about-tax-exempt-groups [https://perma.cc 
/2Z5L-2ZFH] (“Celia Roady, a prominent Washington lawyer in private practice . . . said that she received a 
call from Lerner the day before the May 10 conference, requesting that Roady ask a question about tax 
exempt groups.”). 
42 See U.S. SENATE, IRS & TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES, supra note 40 (“As the release date for 
the TIGTA audit report neared, Acting IRS Commissioner Steven Miller decided to try to preempt news 
coverage of the negative audit results by having the head of the Exempt Organizations Division, Lois Lerner, 
disclose the audit before it was released and apologize for the agency’s conduct during a conference she was 
scheduled to address.”). 
43 See Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W. Peters, Republicans Expand I.R.S. Inquiry, With Eye on 
White House, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/18/us/politics/irs-scandal-
congressional-hearings.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5EHH-QU4P] (noting that the “revelation [of a planted 
question to Lois Lerner] only underscored the ham-handed way the scandal has burst into view.”).  The 
Senate report states that Ms. Lerner’s “apology triggered a public firestorm.”  U.S. SENATE, IRS & TIGTA 
MANAGEMENT FAILURES, supra note 40, at 6. 
44 See 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1 (dated May 14, 2013). 
45 Bruce R. Hopkins, “Hot Stuff” for Exempt Organizations Geeks, CV018 ALI-ABA 1 (Nov. 
2013), http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/CV018_chapter_01_thumb.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/85WQ-6R2Y].  The previous Commissioner of the IRS, Douglas Shulman, had stepped down at the 
end of his term after testifying before the House that the IRS had not engaged in targeting.  See Robert W. 
Wood, Despite Lois Lerner Pass, Judge Orders IRS to Release Key Target List Administration Blocked, 
FORBES (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/04/06/despite-lois-lerner-pass-judge-
orders-irs-to-release-key-target-list-administration-blocked. 
44 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.7:36 
September of that year. 46   “Joseph Grant, the Commissioner of the Tax-Exempt and 
Government Entities (TE/GE) Division, announced his retirement eight days after being 
promoted;”47 and Holly Paz, Director of Rulings and Agreements in the TE/GE Division, 
was put on administrative leave48 and then removed from that position.49 
At least four Congressional committees conducted investigations and hearings,50 
and the FBI and DOJ began criminal investigations. 51   TIGTA conducted a criminal 
investigation into Lois Lerner emails that the IRS said were lost.52  “Politicians were quick 
to denounce the IRS.  House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), for one, didn’t bother with 
niceties.  ‘Who is going to jail over this scandal?’ he asked.”53  The House Ways and Means 
Committee opened a website entitled “The IRS Political Discrimination Investigation” to 
collect tax-exempt organizations’ stories.54  Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA), then-Chair of the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, seemed to view Lois Lerner as a 
villain of the piece,55 and he introduced a resolution56 under which the House voted to hold 
her in contempt of Congress after she made a short statement proclaiming her innocence57 
before invoking the Fifth Amendment.58 
                                                      
46 Michael Wyland, Lois Lerner “Retires” From IRS as Scandal Investigations Continue, 
NONPROFIT Q. (Sept. 24, 2013), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/22954-lois-lerner-retires-
from-irs-as-scandal-investigations-continue.html [https://perma.cc/E6QU-YHUS]. 
47 Richard Rubin & Roxana Tiron, IRS Chief Says 2010 Meeting Under Review Was Unfortunate, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 1, 2013). 
48 U.S. SENATE, IRS & TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES, supra note 40, at 12. 
49 Associated Press, IRS Supervisor Scrutinized Tea Party Cases, FOX NEWS (June 17, 2013), 
https://www.questia.com/newspaper/1P2-36649244/irs-supervisor-scrutinized-tea-party-cases [https://perma 
.cc/65DJ-JVAU] (stating that Paz, “who until recently was a top deputy in the division that handles 
applications for tax-exempt status,” has been “replaced”).  The people moved into these four positions had 
“Acting” status and were replaced in December 2013.  See U.S. SENATE, IRS & TIGTA MANAGEMENT 
FAILURES, supra note 40, at 11–13 (separately discussing who was put in each of these positions). 
50 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
51 See supra text accompanying notes 2–3. 
52 Stephen Dinan, IRS Watchdog Reveals Lois Lerner Missing Emails Now Subject of Criminal 
Probe, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/26/irs-watchdog-
reveals-lois-lerner-missing-emails-no/?page=all [https://perma.cc/N33S-5BMY]; see also Stephen Dinan, IRS 
Finds Yet Another Lois Lerner Email Account, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes 
.com/news/2015/aug/24/irs-finds-yet-another-lois-lerner-email-account [https://perma.cc/YHK7-Q2DG]. 
53 Sam Stein, IRS Scandal Hearings Put Inspector General in the Spotlight, HUFFINGTON POST 
(July 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/irs-scandal_n_3611460.html [https://perma.cc 
/D2D6-2WMS]. 
54 See Aaron Mercer, House Committee Wants to Hear from IRS Targeting Victims, NAT’L 
RELIGIOUS BROADCASTERS (June 7, 2013), http://nrb.org/news_room/articles/house-committee-wants-to-hear-
from-irs-targeting-victims/?ccm_paging_p_b33272=6 [https://perma.cc/GPN6-M2F3] (The website, which 
has since been removed, stated, “As the Committee continues to pursue this investigation, this website allows 
those affected by the IRS scandal to share their story.  Your story is critical to moving the investigation 
forward.  Taking a few minutes to fill out the form below and share your story will allow the Committee to 
identify key facts and take action to deal with the failures of the IRS.”). 
55 See Lois Lerner’s Involvement, supra note 40, at 10–11 (stating that Lerner “created 
unprecedented roadblocks for Tea Party organizations, worked surreptitiously to advance new Obama 
Administration regulations that curtail the activities of existing 501(c)(4) organizations—all the while 
attempting to maintain an appearance that her efforts did not appear, in her own words, “per se political.”). 
56 H.R. Res. 574, 113th Cong. (2014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
resolution/574/all-actions [https://perma.cc/LCD8-Q6W3]. 
57 The statement is reproduced in a House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
document.  See Lois Lerner’s Involvement, supra note 40, at 10–11. 
58 Kelly Phillips Erb, House Finds Lerner, Central Figure in Tax Exempt Scandal, in Contempt of 
Congress, FORBES (May 7, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/05/07/house-finds-
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A determination letter from the IRS traditionally was not even required for tax 
exemption.59  So, what brought about the IRS’s actions and TIGTA’s report?  The next 
Section describes the forces that led to the controversy. 
A. The Rise of Political 501(c)(4)s 
A logical first question is why tax-exempt organizations involved in political 
activity might claim tax exemption under Code section 501(c)(4), given the existence of 
Code section 527 (titled “Political Organizations”).  Section 501(c)(4) provides tax 
exemption for: 
 Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but 
operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local 
associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the 
employees of a designated person or persons in a particular municipality, 
and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, 
educational, or recreational purposes.60 
Read literally, the statute prohibits an organization engaging in any activity that 
does not promote social welfare from receiving exemption under Code section 501(c)(4).  
Treasury regulations interpret campaigning and similar political activity as not promoting 
social welfare.61  However, the Treasury Department has long interpreted the statutory 
exclusivity requirement as requiring that a qualifying organization be “primarily engaged 
in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people of the 
community.”62 Because the Treasury regulation requires only that a 501(c)(4) be primarily 
(not exclusively) engaged in the promotion of social welfare, it allows a 501(c)(4) to 
engage in a significant amount of political activity.  Treasury’s goal seems to have been to 
allow organizations that did not qualify under 501(c)(3) because of excessive lobbying 
activity to qualify under 501(c)(4)63 as long as the primary purpose of the organization was 
                                                      
lerner-central-figure-in-tax-exempt-scandal-in-contempt-of-congress (“The vote was 231 Yeas to 187 Nays.  
Of the votes, 225 of the Yeas were from Republicans; all of the Nays were from Democrats.”).  U.S. Attorney 
Donald C. Machen, Jr., subsequently found that Ms. Lerner had not waived her Fifth Amendment rights and 
refused to prosecute her.  See Michael S. Schmidt, Former I.R.S. Official Won’t Be Charged for Refusing to 
Testify, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/us/lois-lerner-former-irs-official-
wont-be-charged-for-refusing-to-testify.html [https://perma.cc/352X-T65W]. 
59 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS FOR TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 13 (2013), http://www 
.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/FullReport/Special-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JRB-UNGB] 
[hereinafter NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, SPECIAL REPORT] (“[O]rganizations can begin operating as tax-
exempt under IRC § 501(c)(4) before receiving a determination letter from the IRS . . . .”).  The PATH Act of 
2015 has since required nonprofits seeking exemption under Code section 501(c)(4) to file a one-page notice 
of registration within 60 days after the organization is formed.  See infra note 260 and accompanying text. 
60 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (emphasis added).  Professor Lily Kahng explains that social welfare is 
“defined to be ‘the common good and general welfare of the people of the community’ and ‘bringing about 
civic betterments and social improvements.’”  Kahng, supra note 6, at 44–45A (footnote omitted). 
61 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (“The promotion of social welfare does not include 
direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any 
candidate for public office.”). 
62 Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (emphasis added); T.D. 6391, 1959-2 C.B. 139, 145–46. 
63 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,495 (Apr. 27, 1967) (“The contemplated effect of this provision 
of the regulations is that even though an organization fails to achieve classification under section 501(c)(3) 
because it engages in . . . lobbying and propagandizing, it does not necessarily follow that it would not 
achieve exempt status under section 501(c)(4) as well.”).  Section 501(c)(3) organizations can receive 
deductible contributions but 501(c)(4)s cannot.  See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (“‘charitable contribution’ means a 
contribution or gift to . . . [a] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation—which is not 
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not participation in political campaigns.64  Section 501(c)(4) therefore encompasses both 
organizations that engage in no political activity at all65 and advocacy groups such as “the 
Sierra Club and the National Rifle Association.”66 
Professor Lloyd Mayer has explained that, in the 1960s, a corollary to the rule that 
political activity could not be a 501(c)(4)’s primary activity was that “organizations 
engaged primarily in political activity were taxable.”67  However, as he observes, that 
principle did not specifically address the question of whether the donations received by 
political organizations should be included in taxable income.  To resolve this issue, 
Congress enacted Code section 527 in 1975,68 which provides tax-exemption for those 
organizations, as well, but only with respect to donated funds the organization sets aside 
for political use.69 
Thus, until fairly recently, political organizations generally would simply use Code 
section 527.70   However, in 2000, the law changed in an important way: it required 
organizations organized under section 527 to disclose who their donors are.71  Experts 
predicted that a wholesale shift from 527 organizations to 501(c)(4)s would result. 72  
However, that shift did not occur until 2010, after the Supreme Court decided Citizens 
United,73 which allowed corporations to spend unlimited amounts of funds on election 
activity.74  However, Treasury regulations still require that an organization be primarily 
engaged in promoting general welfare—not politics—in order to qualify for tax exemption 
under Code section 501(c)(4).  That, in turn, calls for IRS screening of 501(c)(4) 
determination requests. 
                                                      
disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and 
which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”). 
64 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,495, supra note 63 (distinguishing permissible lobbying from 
involvement in political campaigns and stating, “It was our view that so long as activities of this [latter] type 
were clearly germane to a recognized social welfare purpose, and stop short of being an organization’s 
primary activity, then the regulation’s language would not operate to preclude exempt status for the 
organization.”). 
65 Kahng, supra note 6, at 47A (referencing “The Lumberjack World Championships Foundation 
and The Ballroom Latin and Swing Dance Association”). 
66 Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 639 
(2007). 
67 Id. 
68 See Pub. L. 93-625, § 10(a) (1975). 
69 Mayer, supra note 66, at 640. 
70 Id. 
71 I.R.C. § 527(e)(5)(A)(ii), (iii) (“The term ‘qualified State or local political organization’ means a 
political organization . . . which [among other requirements] is subject to State law that requires the 
organization to report (and it so reports) . . . information regarding the person who makes such contribution 
or receives such expenditure . . . and . . . with respect to which the reports [above] . . . are . . . made public 
. . . .”). 
72 Kahng, supra note 6, at 48A. 
73 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibited the government from banning political speech based on the 
speaker’s identity as a non-profit or for-profit corporation). 
74 See Robert Maguire, Editorial, A New Low in Campaign Finance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/opinion/a-new-low-in-campaign-finance.html [https://perma.cc/GZM6-
G9PM] (“Election-related spending by groups that don’t disclose their donors has grown exponentially in the 
last few years . . . . The expenditures reported by these groups rose from just under $6 million in 2004 to 
$308 million in the last presidential election.”); see also Kahng, supra note 6, at 48A (noting that “Crossroads 
GPS . . . was founded by Karl Rove in 2010 and spent at least $70 million in the 2012 election cycle”). 
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B. The Exempt Organizations Division’s Challenges 
During the rise of political 501(c)(4)s, the IRS’s Exempt Organizations (EO) 
Division faced significant challenges.  First, the EO Division experienced a spike in 
applications for a reason unrelated to Citizens United.  That is because, starting in 2011, a 
change in the law resulted in automatic revocation of the tax-exempt status of organizations 
that had not filed returns in three years. 75   The result was a purge that led many 
organizations to reapply, resulting in a spike in requests for determination letters.76  The 
spike consisted of approximately 30,000 applications in addition to the normal volume of 
approximately 60,000.77  Thus, the EO Division was dealing with a significant backlog of 
cases.  Moreover, the IRS’s outdated technology made it difficult for managers to observe 
and handle the size of that backlog.78 
The management issues seem to have been exacerbated by the geographic 
organization of the EO Division.  The Division centralized in Cincinnati in the 1990s—far 
from IRS headquarters—because that city had a history of being able to hire employees at 
low pay.79  The pay scale for those positions was such that the IRS could not find qualified 
people to fill them in larger cities.80  Thus, IRS resources influenced the structure of the 
Division. 
Most of the employees in Cincinnati screened applications to ascertain whether to 
grant a determination of tax-exempt status,81 while people in positions like the one Lois 
Lerner held—Director of the EO Division—were located at headquarters in Washington.82  
The result was a geographic separation of upper-level management from the employees in 
Cincinnati actually doing the day-to-day screening of applications. 
In addition, during the time period in which applications for determinations of tax-
exempt status had increased dramatically, the IRS had experienced budget cuts that 
decreased the number of employees working in that area.83  Fewer than 200 employees 
                                                      
75 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-15-164, REPORT TO THE RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: BETTER 
COMPLIANCE INDICATORS AND DATA, AND MORE COLLABORATION WITH STATE REGULATORS WOULD 
STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 30 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667595 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5NF-TAE6] [hereinafter GAO, BETTER COMPLIANCE INDICATORS].  Most tax-exempt 
organizations are required to file Form 990 annually.  See 2014 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF 
ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM TAX 2, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CGU-
K3RH]. 
76 See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 27. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Kim Barker & Justin Elliott, How the IRS’s Nonprofit Division Got So Dysfunctional, 
PROPUBLICA (May 17, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-irs-nonprofit-division-got-so-
dysfunctional [https://perma.cc/6DM6-NQS4]. 
80 See id. (quoting Marcus Owens, who ran the Exempt Organizations division from 1990 to 2000 
as explaining that in New York City, “We had one accountant who just had gotten out of jail—that’s the sort 
of people who would show up for jobs.”). 
81 Id. 
82 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 29 (showing an organizational chart locating in 
Washington, D.C. management offices such as the Acting Commissioner of the Tax Exempt and Government 
Entities Division (EO) and Director, EO).  Lois Lerner was the Director of the EO Division.  See supra text 
accompanying note 40. 
83 GAO, BETTER COMPLIANCE INDICATORS, supra note 75, at 30. 
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worked directly on applications.84  As a result, each Cincinnati employee would need to 
review an average of one application per day, and some of them were very time-consuming 
because of the need “to look through a group’s website, track down TV ads and so forth.”85  
Moreover, the limits on political participation are difficult to define and interpret,86 and 
they call for a messy facts-and-circumstances test.87  Because 501(c)(4) determination 
denials were not subject to judicial review, there was no case law to serve as a guide.88 
C. The Targeting Allegations 
In February of 2012, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
received complaints that “the IRS was delaying the approval of conservative-oriented 
organizations for tax exempt status”89 and began investigating.90  Rep. Darrell Issa, then-
Chair of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, “asked TIGTA to 
determine whether conservative groups were being targeted by the IRS.”91  Note that the 
allegation was not that the IRS was denying 501(c)(4) applications of any organizations 
but rather focused on (1) delays and (2) negative effects on conservative groups. 
The TIGTA report found both effects: It found that organizations the IRS selected 
for further review “experienced substantial delays. . . . Some cases have been open during 
two election cycles (2010 and 2012),”92 and that the IRS inappropriately used key-word 
searches “that identified for review Tea Party and other organizations.”93   Although 
TIGTA did not accuse the IRS of being biased, the language it used, such as the portions 
italicized above, could raise that concern. 
                                                      
84 Internal Revenue Serv., Questions and Answers on 501(c) Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-501(c)-Organizations [https://perma 
.cc/H3WK-U7LW] [hereinafter Internal Revenue Serv., Questions and Answers]. 
85 Barker & Elliott, supra note 79. 
86 See Kahng, supra note 6, at 45–46A (courts might view that as “somewhere in the range of ten to 
fifteen percent of an organization’s expenditures” but “the IRS seems to take a more liberal position, 
although it has never set out a specific percentage, and some practitioners argue that the threshold is as high 
as forty or even forty-nine percent.”) (citing Mariam Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications for 
Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165, 167 n.20 (2006)). 
87 Id. at 46A. 
88 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 2.  The PATH Act of 2015 
amended Code section 7428 to extend declaratory judgment actions, including on the initial qualification for 
tax-exempt status, to 501(c)(4) and other tax-exempt organizations.  Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 406. 
89 Lois Lerner’s Involvement, supra note 40, at 6. 
90 Id. (“On February 17, 2012, Committee staff requested a briefing from the IRS about this matter.  
On February 24, 2012, Lerner and other IRS officials provided the Committee staff with an informal 
briefing.”). 
91 Teresa Ambord, IRS Scandal Shifts Focus to Russell George, ACCOUNTINGWEB (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.accountingweb.com/tax/irs/irs-scandal-shifts-focus-to-russell-george [https://perma.cc/9AK8-
JLFC].  See also 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that TIGTA “initiated this audit based on 
concerns expressed by members of Congress.”).  See also Bernie Becker, Treasury IG: Liberal Groups 
Weren’t Targeted by IRS like Tea Party, THE HILL (June 27, 2013), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/308131-
ig-liberal-groups-not-targeted-like-tea-party [https://perma.cc/TUL3-H2NG] (“[A] spokesman for the 
inspector general said they were only tasked with looking into whether conservative groups faced tough IRS 
scrutiny.”).  A Senate Finance Committee report explains that “[t]he greater number of Tea Party applications 
resulted in a greater number of Tea Party applications being scrutinized” which could lead to a belief that 
they were targeted or even being used to support “an unproven narrative of bias against nonprofits on the 
conservative side of the political spectrum.”  S. REP. NO. 114-119, at 249 (2015). 
92 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 11 (emphasis added). 
93 Id. at i (Highlights) (emphasis added).  The report adds, “Subsequently, the Determinations Unit 
expanded the criteria to inappropriately include organizations with other specific names (Patriots and 9/12) or 
policy positions.”  Id. at 5. 
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After TIGTA’s report, some Republican lawmakers suggested that President 
Obama used the IRS to cloud the tax status of Tea Party organizations during the 2010 and 
2012 elections.94  Some commentators analogized to former President Richard Nixon’s 
infamous “Enemies List.”95  However, as described below, neither TIGTA nor anyone else 
found involvement by President Obama, and in fact, the explanation both TIGTA and the 
Department of Justice have given for the delays is much more banal than these accusations 
suggest.96 
1. Delays 
TIGTA identified the delays as beginning in April 2010, when the IRS designated 
a “specialist”—later a team of specialists97—to process “potential political cases.”98  At 
that time, the Determinations Unit Program Manager, Lucinda (Cindy) Thomas,99 who was 
located in Cincinnati,100 requested assistance from the Technical Unit,101 which is part of 
the Rulings and Agreements office in Washington, D.C.102  She did not receive prompt 
guidance.103 
In September 2010, Max Baucus (D-MT), Chair of the Senate Committee on 
Finance, wrote to then-IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman, asking him to investigate 
whether 501(c)(4) organizations were complying with the Code, in light of media reports 
about politically active 501(c)(4) organizations.104  Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT) and 
                                                      
94 See, e.g., COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOW 
POLITICS LED THE IRS TO TARGET CONSERVATIVE TAX-EXEMPT APPLICANTS FOR THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS 
(2014), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/How-Politics-Led-to-the-IRS-Targeting-
Staff-Report-6.16.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6MH-HD7D] (alleging that “President Obama’s Bully Pulpit led 
to the Internal Revenue Service’s targeting of conservative tax-exempt applicants”); Lisa Rein & Juliet 
Elperin, House GOP Leader’s Final Report on IRS Targeting Accuses Agency of ‘Culture of Bias,’ WASH. 
POST (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/12/23/house-gop-leaders-
final-report-on-irs-targeting-accuses-agency-of-culture-of-bias [https://perma.cc/7JJT-8BVH] (“House 
Republicans have alleged that the Obama administration used the IRS and other enforcement agencies to 
silence conservative critics during the 2010 and 2012 election cycles, when the targeting occurred.”). 
95 See Matthew Vadum, A President’s Enemies List?: Add IRS-Gate to a Scandal-Ridden 
Administration, FRONTPAGE MAG (May 13, 2013), http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/189411/presidents-
enemies-list-matthew-vadum (“Some commentators draw parallels with President Richard Nixon, noting he 
came dangerously close to impeachment for unleashing the IRS on his enemies.”).  During his presidency, 
Richard Nixon “pressured the IRS to initiate tax audits and otherwise harass opponents of the administration 
or its policies.”  JOHN A. ANDREW III, POWER TO DESTROY: THE POLITICAL USES OF THE IRS FROM KENNEDY 
TO NIXON 201 (Ivan R. Dee ed. 2002). 
96 TIGTA’s investigation is described immediately below.  For the results of the Department of 
Justice’s investigation, see infra text accompanying notes 138–139. 
97 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 & n.14 (stating that the team was expanded from one 
specialist to several specialists in December 2011). 
98 Id. at 13. 
99 U.S. SENATE, IRS & TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES, supra note 40, at 12–13 (noting that in 
August 2013, Ms. Thomas moved out of that position, which she had held since 2005, and became a senior 
technical advisor to the EO Director). 
100 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 29 (showing an organizational chart with geographic 
locations). 
101 Id. at 13. 
102 Id. at 1. 
103 See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
104 See Darrell Issa, Chairman, Lois Lerner’s Involvement, supra note 40, at 2–3 (Letter from Max 
Baucus, Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance, to Douglas H. Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue 
Service (Sept. 28, 2010)).  Baucus’s letter mentioned a New York Times article and a Time Magazine article.  
Id. at App. 4 at 3.  It did not mention any 501(c)(4) organizations by name, although it referred to groups 
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then-Minority Whip Jon Kyl (R-AZ) soon reacted, asking “the IRS to make sure any such 
probe does not take political considerations into account and requested that an inspector 
general review any investigation to make sure it is not partisan.”105  The result was pressure 
on the IRS from both the left and the right, which may have left some employees hesitant 
to take action.106 
In October 2010, the specialists had 40 cases but stopped working on them through 
November 2011 while they waited for written guidance from the Technical Unit. 107  
Compounding the problem, Cindy Thomas, the Determinations Unit Program Manager, 
was unaware that the specialists were not working on those cases for this 13-month 
period.108 
2. Selection Criteria 
The second part of the issue Republicans raised was the manner in which the IRS 
selected applications for further review.  TIGTA’s report found that the “Be On the 
Lookout” (BOLO) list of words to watch for in 501(c)(4) applicants’ names109 originated 
in May 2010 as a spreadsheet compiled by Determinations Unit specialists in Cincinnati.  
The Cincinnati office distributed the first formal BOLO listing in August of that year.110 
The National Taxpayer Advocate describes the BOLO lists as resulting from IRS 
employee attempts to triage the tens of thousands of applications they were receiving.  
                                                      
discussed in the Time Magazine article, entitled “The New GOP Money Stampede.”  Darrell Issa, Chairman, 
Lois Lerner’s Involvement, supra note 40, at App. 4 at 3. 
105 Steven T. Dennis, Battle Escalates Over Undisclosed Campaign Cash, ROLL CALL (Oct. 6, 
2010), http://www.rollcall.com/news/76003-1.html [https://perma.cc/2XVE-XDF6]. 
106 TIGTA observed in its investigative report that “The team of specialists stopped working on 
potential political cases from October 2010 through November 2011, resulting in a 13-month delay, while 
they waited for assistance from the Technical Unit.”  2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. 
107 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 12–13.  Some 
organizations waited much longer because the IRS had requested further information from them and then did 
not act during that 13-month period.  2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. 
108 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.  TIGTA reports that the Director of Rulings and 
Agreements later stated “that there was a miscommunication about processing the cases.”  Id.  That statement 
is ambiguous, in that it could refer to a miscommunication to TIGTA.  However, in context, it appears to 
refer to a miscommunication between Ms. Thomas and the specialists.  The Director of Rulings and 
Agreements at the time was Holly Paz.  See infra note 122. 
109 See Stein, supra note 53. 
110 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.  The BOLO lists apparently distinguished between 
“historical” and “emerging” issues.  See, e.g., Letter from J. Russell George, Inspector Gen., to Rep. Sander 
M. Levin, Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (June 26, 2013), http://online.wsj.com 
/public/resources/documents/TIGTAFinalResponseToRepLevin06262013.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW4L-
354K] [hereinafter George Letter to Levin] (reporting that the term “Progressives” was categorized as a 
“TAG Historical” or “Potential Abusive Historical” term); Josh Hicks, IRS BOLOs: What’s the Problem?, 
WASH. POST (July 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/07/03/irs-bolos-
whats-the-problem [https://perma.cc/7CSV-G9R7] (“The list’s ‘emerging issues’ category included only 
conservative terms at the outset, raising questions about why the IRS prioritized conservative groups but none 
from the left.”).  However, the Senate Finance Committee’s report explained in the section titled “Additional 
Views of Senator Wyden Prepared by Democratic Staff”: 
 According to IRS agent Ron Bell, who was responsible for the BOLO list, 
screening terms were placed on the ‘‘Tag Historical’’ tab after IRS employees were not 
seeing the cases as frequently.  While the organizations with the name ‘‘progressive’’ in 
their name were not applying for tax-exempt status as frequently as conservative or Tea 
Party organizations, the IRS was still instructing its employees to screen and set aside cases 
because of potential political activity based on the word “Progressive.” 
S. REP. NO. 114-119, at 253 (2015) (footnote omitted). 
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Those applications generally fell into three categories.  The easiest applications, IRS 
screeners in the Cincinnati Determinations Unit would approve on “first read.” 111  
Somewhat more complicated applications needed to be assigned to a Determinations Unit 
specialist.112  The most complicated applications, such as those in which no established 
precedent applied, would be sent to an EO Technical Unit specialist in Washington, DC to 
work on before being returned to Cincinnati and assigned to a Determinations Unit 
specialist.113 
Given the flood of applications and limited personnel, IRS employees began using 
key words to try to identify groups likely to be engaging in political activity.114  As the 
National Taxpayer Advocate notes, “The employees presumably assumed that an 
application for tax exemption from an organization with ‘Tea Party’ or similar terms in its 
name was more likely to be focused primarily on political activity, rather than the common 
good and general welfare, as required by law.”115  These “potential political cases” were 
referred to the Determinations Unit specialists for further review. 116   Although only 
approximately one-third of the cases sent for additional review contained these words,117 
the optics were disastrous.  TIGTA subsequently found that “Determinations Unit 
employees . . . did not consider the public perception of using politically sensitive criteria 
when identifying these cases.”118 
IRS management did not step in immediately to stop the Cincinnati employees’ 
efforts to simplify their jobs.  The issue was not that IRS management endorsed the 
Cincinnati employees’ development of key-word criteria but rather that they were unaware 
that the employees had done so.119 
The 2013 TIGTA report found that when Ms. Lerner was briefed on the criteria in 
June 2011, she “immediately directed that the criteria be changed.  In July 2011, the criteria 
were changed to focus on the potential ‘political, lobbying, or [general] advocacy’ 
activities of the organization.” 120   However, the Determinations Unit employees had 
trouble applying these fact-sensitive criteria and in January 2012, the Determinations Unit 
“changed the criteria . . . without executive approval because they believed the July 2011 
criteria were too broad.” 121 
It took three months for Holly Paz, the Director of Rulings and Agreements122 to 
learn that the Determinations Unit had changed the criteria.123  She revised the criteria in 
                                                      




115 Id. at 12. 
116 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. 
117 Id. at 8. 
118 Id. at 7 (also stating that “the criteria developed showed a lack of knowledge in the 
Determinations Unit of what activities are allowed by I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) 
organizations”). 
119 Id. (finding that IRS management exercised insufficient oversight). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Holly Paz was the Director of Rulings and Agreements from January 2011 to June 2013.  U.S. 
SENATE, IRS & TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES, supra note 40, at 12. 
123 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. 
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May 2012 and issued a memorandum requiring all subsequent changes to the BOLO lists 
to obtain prior executive-level approval.124 
3. The Political Controversy 
The idea that the civil servants in Cincinnati singled out Tea Party groups for 
further review may be surprising to some, given that the Determinations Unit employees 
are not political appointees.  TIGTA’s report found that Determinations Unit employees 
used the term “Tea Party” as “shorthand” for all potentially political cases.125  Moreover, 
recall that the charge Congress gave TIGTA apparently was to “determine whether 
conservative groups were being targeted by the IRS.”126  It appears that Congress did not 
ask TIGTA to undertake a comparative study or to examine whether progressive groups 
experienced delays.127 
TIGTA’s report thus did not address the treatment of progressive groups.  It did 
not provide a comparative analysis of the treatment of left-leaning and right-leaning 
groups.  In addition, it did not mention that a July 2010 IRS “Screening Workshop” 
PowerPoint presentation lists under “Current Activities” both “Tea Party” and 
“Progressive” groups.128  The report also did not mention that the IRS apparently denied 
tax-exempt status to at least one progressive organization but not to any conservative 
organizations.129  In addition, one of TIGTA’s “own investigators had concluded from a 
review of 5,500 emails that the targeting had not been politically motivated,” but the report 
did not mention that.130 
The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Majority Staff Report called out TIGTA for 
a flawed report, management failures in its audit, and failure to disclose for weeks that the 
IRS had included progressive key words on the BOLO lists, “even though it was directly 
                                                      
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Ambord, supra note 91. 
127 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
128 See Stein, supra note 53 (“Democrats on the House Ways and Means Committee turned up a 
2010 IRS PowerPoint presentation that said both ‘progressive’ groups and ‘tea party’ organizations deserved 
extra scrutiny when applying for tax-exempt status.”).  The PowerPoint (with some redactions labeled 
“6103”) is available at http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov 
/files/IRSR0000006674.pdf [https://perma.cc/57KP-3XHH].  “The notes from the meeting [at which the 
PowerPoint was shown] state that Gary Muthert indicated that the ‘following names and/or titles were of 
interest and should be flagged for review: 
• ‘9/12 Project, 
• ‘Emerge [“an organization that sought to train female Democratic political candidates”], 
• ‘Progressive, 
• ‘We The People, 
• ‘Rally Patriots, and 
• ‘Pink-Slip Program.’” 
S. REP. NO. 114-119, at 252 (2015). 
129 Cummings & Levin, supra note 7 (referencing a statement of then-IRS Acting Commissioner 
Daniel Werfel). 
130 Sam Stein, IRS Scandal Hearings Put Inspector General in the Spotlight, HUFFINGTON POST 
(July 17, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/irs-scandal_n_3611460.html [https:// 
perma.cc/5TPT-AV6N].  The report did state, “According to the Director, Rulings and Agreements, the fact 
that the team of specialists worked applications that did not involve the Tea Party, Patriots, or 9/12 groups 
demonstrated that the IRS was not politically biased in its identification of applications for processing by the 
team of specialists.”  2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. 
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relevant to TIGTA’s audit objective and could have helped alleviate public concern about 
potential IRS political bias.”131  The Majority Staff Report found that: 
[T]he IRS subjected not only conservative groups with “Tea Party,” 
“9/12,” or “Patriot” in their names to heightened scrutiny, but also liberal 
groups with “Progressive,” “Progress,” “ACORN,” “Emerge,” or 
“Occupy” in their names.  The evidence also shows that, from 2010 to 
mid-2013, more conservative groups than liberal groups applied for tax 
exempt status, underwent IRS scrutiny, and ultimately won tax exempt 
status.132 
In June 2013, Inspector General Russell George stated in a letter to Rep. Levin: 
We reviewed all cases that the IRS identified as potential political cases 
and did not limit our audit to allegations related to the Tea Party. . . . From 
our audit work, we did not find evidence that the criteria you identified, 
labeled ‘Progressives,’ were used by the IRS to select potential political 
cases during the 2010 to 2012 timeframe we audited.133 
The letter further stated that “[t]he ‘Progressives’ criteria appeared on a section of the ‘Be 
On the Look Out’ (BOLO) spreadsheet labeled ‘Historical,’ and, unlike other BOLO 
entries, did not include instructions on how to refer cases that met the criteria.”134  TIGTA’s 
additional research reported in the June letter found that of the applications filed during the 
time period of the initial audit, six applications with “progress” or “progressive” in the 
organization’s name were included in the IRS’s “potential political cases” while fourteen 
were not.135  It contrasted that with 100 percent inclusion of organizations with names that 
included the terms Tea Party, 9/12, or Patriot in their names, which were 96 of the 298 
potentially political cases.136 
Accordingly, it appears that the Cincinnati employees did not treat all of the liberal 
and conservative-sounding groups identically, leaving room for accusations of political 
                                                      
131 U.S. SENATE, IRS & TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES, supra note 40, at 8. 
132 Id. at 4.  At some point, “medical marijuana” was included on the list.  See Hicks, supra note 
110 (“IRS documents released last week have complicated matters.  They show that terms such as 
‘progressive,’ ‘blue’ and ‘medical marijuana’ appeared on a multi-part ‘Be on the Lookout’ list . . . .”). 
133 George Letter to Levin, supra note 110, at 1. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 1–2.  Seventy-two of the ninety-six used the term “Tea Party” in the organization’s name, 
eleven used “9/12,” and thirteen used “Patriots.”  2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 fig. 4.  It is 
possible that some employees treated the “Tea Party” label as shorthand for all potentially political cases 
while others took the label literally and did not apply the same procedures to other groups.  Cf. Philip 
Hackney, An Examination of the IRS Tea Party Affair, 49 VAL. L. REV. 453, 479 (2015) (“Some testimony 
indicates that some Service employees viewed the term Tea Party cases as a generic category, like someone 
might refer to coke as a generic term for soft drink.  Other testimony seems to suggest that some employees 
understood in the early stage that they should be pulling and looking at only Tea Party-related organizations 
and should avoid looking at any others.”) (footnote omitted).  A Senate Report also explains that after two 
Tea Party cases were identified and subject to further review in Washington, D.C.: 
[I]t can be argued that it was logical to develop a method of collecting all the Tea Party 
applications that continued to surface in Cincinnati.  The BOLO list can be seen as an 
efficient procedure to use to make sure personnel in Cincinnati identified the right 
applications to set aside while Washington D.C. determined the best way to deal with these 
applications.  Applications by left-leaning groups were also collected in this manner. 
S. REP. NO. 114-119, at 251 (2015).  However, this does not seem to explain why all of the organizations 
containing “9/12” or “Patriots” were treated as potentially political while only some of those using the term 
“Progress” were. 
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bias.137  However, in October 2015, the DOJ, after a two-year investigation, found “no 
evidence that any IRS official acted based on political, discriminatory, corrupt, or 
inappropriate motives that would support a criminal prosecution.”138  Instead, the DOJ 
found that IRS mismanagement was the culprit.139  The FBI reached the same conclusion 
in its investigation.140  The DOJ and FBI’s conclusions align with TIGTA’s finding of 
insufficient oversight by IRS management.141 
D. The IRS’s Response to the Controversy 
The IRS reacted quickly and extensively to the 501(c)(4) controversy.  One day 
after TIGTA released its report, the IRS stated on its website that it had made mistakes.142  
The IRS also changed its procedures relating to determinations of tax-exempt status.  
Among other things, it suspended the use of watch lists, including BOLO lists.143  TIGTA 
found in a follow-up audit in March 2015 that the IRS was no longer using BOLO lists.144 
The IRS also directly addressed the delays many non-profits had experienced by 
instituting an expedited review process for all applications for tax-exempt status in which 
the organization had stated that it might be engaged in political activities.145  Under an IRS 
procedure, if the application of such an organization had been pending for more than 120 
days, the IRS would grant the application within two weeks if an authorized official from 
the organization made certain declarations about the organization’s planned activities, 
under penalty of perjury.146 
This program succeeded in expediting the grant of applications for determinations 
of tax-exempt status.  TIGTA found in its March 2015 follow-up audit that the IRS had 
“completed processing for 149 of the 160 applications for tax-exempt status that, as of 
December 2012, had been open for lengthy periods.”147  The IRS reported that, as of July 
2015, it had resolved 97 percent of the 145 organizations’ applications included in the new 
                                                      
137 See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text.  Republican minority staff included a dissent 
to the Senate’s report that argued, “Far fewer liberal groups were investigated by the IRS, and those that were 
received less intrusive questioning, the dissent said, adding that in some cases the liberal groups were 
affiliated with organizations that had behaved illegally in the past and as a result could expect extra scrutiny.”  
Id.  See also Media Prompted IRS to Target Conservative Groups, Oversight Committee Finds, 2013 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 182-29 (Sept. 18, 2013) (stating that “The ACORN entry appears primarily on the Watch List 
tab of the BOLO spreadsheet whereas the Tea Party entry appears on the Emerging Issues tab of the 
spreadsheet. . . . [N]otes from the July 2010 screening group workshop state that while progressive 
applications should be ‘flagged,’ only Tea Party applicants were to be sent to a special coordinator.”). 
138 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Letter to the Hon. Bob Goodlatte, supra note 3. 
139 See id. at 1. 
140 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
142 See Internal Revenue Serv., Questions and Answers, supra note 84, at Q&A 12 (“Did mistakes 
occur in working the centralized cases?  Yes.  Applicants whose cases were centralized unfortunately 
experienced inappropriate delays and over-expansive information requests in some cases.  This was caused 
by ineffective processes and not related to the selection criteria used for the centralization of a case.”).  That 
document is dated May 15, 2013.  TIGTA’s report is dated May 14, 2013.  See 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra 
note 1. 
143 See Daniel Werfel, Charting a Path Forward at the IRS: Initial Assessment and Plan of Action 
App. C (June 24, 2013), https://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/Initial%20Assessment%20and%20Plan%20of 
%20Action.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GRF-BDZW]. 
144 TIGTA, STATUS OF ACTIONS TAKEN, supra note 19, at 3. 
145 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, “The Better Part of Valour is Discretion”: Should the IRS Change or 
Surrender its Oversight of Tax-Exempt Organizations?, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 80, 103–04 (2016). 
146 Id. at 27. 
147 TIGTA, STATUS OF ACTIONS TAKEN, supra note 19, Highlights; see also id. at 16. 
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process, and by November 2015, it had resolved 98 percent.148  Subsequently, as discussed 
below, Congress enacted a streamlined procedure that requires nonprofits seeking 
exemption under Code section 501(c)(4) to file a one-page notice of registration within 60 
days after the organization is formed and for the IRS to acknowledge receipt of the form 
within 60 days.149 
III. THE 1997/1998 COLLECTIONS CONTROVERSY 
The recent IRS hearings may strike a familiar chord for some observers: The IRS 
experienced hearings similar in tone in 1997 and 1998.  The path to the earlier hearings 
was somewhat different because it started with IRS technology issues.  However, as 
described below, perceived failures by the IRS were an important catalyst, and the end 
result was “reform” of the IRS.150 
A. The Story Behind the IRS Reform Act of 1998 
One of the initial forces behind the 1998 reform was the IRS’s perceived failure in 
implementing a multi-year computer project called “Tax Systems Modernization 
(TSM),”151 which was designed to be “a complete business re-engineering of the IRS over 
a decade.”152  In 1996, when TSM was shut down,153 Representative Jim Lightfoot (R-IA), 
who chaired the House appropriations subcommittee responsible for IRS budgets said, “To 
date this has been a $4 billion fiasco.”154  That was an exaggeration, however, both because 
the IRS spent significantly less than that on TSM155 and because a substantial portion of 
the IRS’s TSM expenditures went into infrastructure that continued to be useful even after 
TSM was cancelled.156 
                                                      
148 TIGTA Recommendation #7: Details and Status, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov 
/Charities-&-Non-Profits/TIGTA-Recommendation-7 [https://perma.cc/7AJR-DADG].  The IRS 
subsequently expanded the expedited-review program to provide the possibility of granting later applicants 
the same approach.  See Mayer, supra note 145, at 103–04.  However, that was superseded by new 
procedures in the PATH Act.  See infra notes 260–261 and accompanying text. 
149 See infra notes 260–261 and accompanying text. 
150 Joseph J. Thorndike, Annual Regulation of Business Focus: Reorganization of the Internal 
Revenue Service: Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 
765 (2001). 
151 Id. 
152 COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMM. BD. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, CONTINUED REVIEW OF THE TAX 
SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: FINAL REPORT 13 (1996), http://www.nap.edu 
/read/10771/chapter/3 [https://perma.cc/72N2-5LD4] [hereinafter CONTINUED REVIEW OF TSM]. 
153 Bozeman, Organizational Culture, supra note 35, at 131.  The Treasury Department stepped in 
in early 1996 and halted work on TSM projects while it reviewed the program.  NAT’L COMM’N ON 
RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RESTRUCTURING 
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: A VISION FOR A NEW IRS 73–74 (June 25, 1997), http://www.house.gov 
/natcommirs/final.htm [https://perma.cc/PEA6-WE2M] [hereinafter REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION]. 
154 Robert D. Hershey, Jr., A Technological Overhaul of I.R.S. is Called a Fiasco, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
15, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/15/us/a-technological-overhaul-of-irs-is-called-a-fiasco.html 
[https://perma.cc/8MV2-R8QF]. 
155 The IRS responded that it had spent only $2.7 billion on TSM.  Id.  The IRS’s figure is more 
plausible.  GAO reported that the IRS had spent $2.5 billion on TSM through 1995.  U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., 
GAO/AIMD-95-156, TAX SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION: MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL WEAKNESSES MUST BE 
CORRECTED IF MODERNIZATION IS TO SUCCEED (1995), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155115.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4KD2-DKFJ] [hereinafter GAO, TAX SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION].  Congress appropriated $695 
million for 1996 but held $100 million of that appropriation back.  See infra note 160.  TSM was cancelled in 
1996.  See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
156 See BOZEMAN, INFORMATION MEGA-TECHNOLOGY, supra note 35, at 7 (explaining that much of 
the funding went into software and hardware the IRS was still using in 2002, and some of the funds went into 
renovating buildings). 
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TSM was created because the IRS had been struggling for years to maintain 
systems that dated from the 1950s and 1960s.157  Congress had frequently ignored the IRS’s 
requests for information-technology funding.158  In 1985, after the IRS introduced new 
technology for processing returns that had been insufficiently tested and simply did not 
work, it had a very public failure: a janitor at the IRS’s Philadelphia Service Center reported 
finding mangled unopened returns in wastebaskets and in the bathroom, including checks 
made out to the IRS aggregating more than $300,000.159  In response to complaints from 
angry constituents, in 1989, Congress approved the IRS’s TSM plan, which the IRS told 
Congress could cost several billion dollars over the course of a ten-year period.160 
TSM was actually not a single project, but rather a group of projects that included 
more than 40 initiatives161 such as Cyberfile, an experiment in filing over the Internet;162 
SCRIPS, the Service Center Recognition/Image Processing System, which was supposed 
to convert paper returns into digital images; and the Document Processing System (DPS), 
which was supposed to produce similar digitized information.163  Many of these projects 
failed to produce technology that worked adequately.164  Barry Bozeman describes the 
problem the IRS had developing and implementing TSM as resulting from the inadequacy 
of state-of-the art technology at the time for many of the IRS’s needs; failure of IRS 
management to recognize that failure was inevitable;165 and an insular, distrusting agency 
culture that limited employees’ willingness to take risks, such as by delivering bad news.166  
However, he also notes that TSM was less of a failure than generally believed, in that much 
of the funding went into software and hardware the IRS was still using in 2002, the time 
of his writing.167 
                                                      
157 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/IMTEC-90-13, TAX SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION: IRS’ CHALLENGE 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (1990), http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/212210.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2RL-8JAT] 
[hereinafter TSM: IRS’ CHALLENGE].  The IRS had abandoned two previous efforts, the first, in 1978, due to 
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leadership changes at Treasury and IRS as well as inadequate technical expertise on the part of IRS 
management.  Id. at 3. 
158 BOZEMAN, INFORMATION MEGA-TECHNOLOGY, supra note 35, at 46. 
159 Bozeman, Organizational Culture, supra note 35, at 125. 
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had spent $2.5 billion on TSM since 1986 and requested another $1.1 billion for fiscal year 1996, with a total 
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supra note 35, at 127 (referring to this as a perceived risk of the project from the IRS’s perspective).  
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INFORMATION MEGA-TECHNOLOGY, supra note 35.  The IRS requested $717 million for TSM for 1994.  Id. at 
1.  Funding was cut for 1996: “Of the $695 million in funding approved for TSM for this year, the conference 
committee restricts IRS from spending $100 million until it receives a full accounting of the $8 billion TSM 
program.”  Christopher J. Dorobek, Tax Systems Modernization Gets $300 Million Less Than IRS Wants, 
GCN (Dec 11, 1995), https://gcn.com/articles/1995/12/11/tax-systems-modernization-gets-300-million-less-
than-irs-wants.aspx [https://perma.cc/3YXR-VNLC]. 
161 Bozeman, Organizational Culture, supra note 35, at 126–27. 
162 Id. at 127. 
163 Id. at 131. 
164 Id. at 127–28, 131. 
165 Id. at 132.  For example, technology at the time was unable to digitize documents that might be 
partly typed, partly handwritten, and might include notes attached to them.  Id. 
166 See id. at 129. 
167 See BOZEMAN, INFORMATION MEGA-TECHNOLOGY, supra note 35, at 7, 43. 
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The GAO issued numerous reports criticizing the IRS’s management of the TSM 
project.168  Congressional support for TSM declined.169  In 1995, Congress approved a 
lower budget for TSM than the IRS requested170 and appointed Senator Bob Kerrey (D-
NE) and Representative Rob Portman (R-OH) co-chairs of a one-year commission to 
examine not only TSM but also consider restructuring the IRS. 171   The impetus for 
considering restructuring the IRS went beyond the problems with TSM.  Taxpayers who 
were subject to line-by-line audits under the program the IRS used for research at the time, 
the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), objected to the burden it 
imposed.172  Taxpayers also complained that it was hard to reach the IRS by telephone173 
and that IRS employees treated them rudely.174 
Although the restructuring commission was bipartisan, IRS reform was a highly 
political process, and the ultimate “reform bore the distinct fingerprints of leading income 
tax antagonists.”175  That is because, in 1994, Democrats had lost control of the House for 
the first time in decades,176  significantly undermining support for progressive income 
                                                      
168 See, e.g., GAO, TAX SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION, supra note 155; GAO, TSM: IRS’ CHALLENGE, 
supra note 157; U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD/AIMD-97-31, TAX SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION: IRS NEEDS 
TO RESOLVE CERTAIN ISSUES WITH ITS INTEGRATED CASE PROCESSING SYSTEM (1997), http://www.gao.gov 
/assets/230/223536.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3XP-VXAP] (hereinafter GAO, IRS NEEDS TO RESOLVE CERTAIN 
ISSUES).  Cf. Thorndike, supra note 150, at 767 (GAO issued “more than 40 . . . reports between 1991 and 
1997 that were critical of IRS management, procedures, and performance.”).  In 1995, GAO added TSM to 
its list of high-risk areas—projects vulnerable to delays, cost overruns, and failure to meet goals.  See GAO, 
IRS NEEDS TO RESOLVE CERTAIN ISSUES, supra, at 7. 
169 The negative reports by GAO and the National Research Council eroded Congress’s support of 
TSM over a period of about three years.  Elana Varon, Congress Threatens TSM Funds, FCW (Mar. 17, 
1996), https://fcw.com/articles/1996/03/17/congress-threatens-tsm-funds.aspx [https://perma.cc/U66A-
HLL5]. 
170 Dorobek, supra note 160. 
171 Id. (“The role of the commission, proposed by Sen. Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.), will be broader than 
merely examining TSM, a Senate staff member said.  ‘We want to look at the way IRS does its business,’ he 
said.”).  See also Thorndike, supra note 150, at 768 n.189. 
172 CONG. RES. SERV. CRS REPORTS ON STATUS OF IRS RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM (Mar. 22, 
2001), LEXIS, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 60-42 [hereinafter CRS REPORTS ON STATUS OF IRS 
RESTRUCTURING].  The IRS later replaced the TCMP with a less intrusive audit program, the National 
Research Program.  See Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. 
L. REV. 161, 167 (2008) (“A[] TCMP was scheduled for the 1994 tax year, but the study was postponed in 
response to anti-IRS political pressure, and then was cancelled in 1995 after Congress significantly reduced 
the IRS budget.  In 2002, the IRS began its National Research Program, or ‘NRP.’  Like the TCMP, the NRP 
selects returns randomly, but it reviews even fewer returns and does so with less intensity than the TCMP.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
173 CRS REPORTS ON STATUS OF IRS RESTRUCTURING, supra note 172.  Through 1996, the IRS’s 
call center technology was geographically based, so a caller would have to wait until an employee at a 
specific geographic location became available.  TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 WAS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPLEMENTED BUT 
CHALLENGES REMAIN 17 (2010), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/iereports/2010reports/2010IER002fr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YZ9A-BZF8].  “Between October 1995 and September 1996, the IRS answered 21 percent 
of all calls.”  Id. 
174 CRS REPORTS ON STATUS OF IRS RESTRUCTURING, supra note 172. 
175 Thorndike, supra note 150, at 766.  See also Ryan J. Donmoyer, Three Days of Hearings Paint 
Picture of Troubled IRS, 76 TAX NOTES 1655, 1658 (1997) (“Although Roth took pains to say his 
investigation was not politically biased and that he did not intend to merely bash the IRS, Democrats 
remained suspicious.  On numerous occasions they quoted from Republican fund-raising letters that 
recommended bashing the agency.”). 
176 Thorndike, supra note 150, at 768. 
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taxation.177  Former IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander noted that pollster Frank Luntz 
recommended that political candidates score points by vilifying the IRS, an approach some 
Congressional leaders adopted.178 
That political context ultimately hijacked the IRS reform process.  The bipartisan 
commission started its work in 1996, and, after a year of research and hearings, released 
its recommendations. 179   The recommendations included “restructuring Congressional 
oversight of the IRS, providing the IRS with a Board of Directors, updating the IRS’s 
technology, requiring the IRS to develop a strategic plan for increasing electronic filing of 
tax returns, increasing taxpayers’ ability to recover damages in appropriate cases, and 
simplification of the tax law.”180   The commission also blamed the laws enacted by 
Congress for some of the IRS’s problems, and urged Congress to consider the effects on 
tax administration before changing the laws.181 
The House responded very favorably, and House Ways and Means Chair Bill 
Archer introduced a bill in 1997 that the House quickly passed in early November.182  
However, while the Senate was still working on the bill,183 Senator William Roth (R-DE), 
then-Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, took the reins and “sought to make the 
legislation his own.”184  The vivid parade of horribles in his fall hearings—a moral panic 
over the actions of IRS collections employees—“effectively altered the tenor of the 
legislation.”185 
B. Hearings and Horror Stories 
In the fall of 1997, Senator Roth oversaw a hearing186 that focused primarily on 
horror stories of IRS abuses of taxpayers.187  The House Ways and Means Committee, not 
                                                      
177 Id. at 766. 
178 Donald C. Alexander, Some Musings About the IRS, 83 TAX NOTES 297, 297 (1999) (citing 
Frank Luntz, 1997 Instructions to Candidates); see also Donmoyer, supra note 175, at 1658 (“Pollster Frank 
Luntz . . . observed that ‘nothing guarantees more applause and more support than the call to abolish the 
IRS.’”). 
179 Thorndike, supra note 150, at 768. 
180 Lederman, supra note 37, at 978 (footnotes omitted). 
181 Thorndike, supra note 150, at 772. 
182 Id. at 774. 
183 CRS REPORTS ON STATUS OF IRS RESTRUCTURING, supra note 172. 
184 Thorndike, supra note 150, at 774. 
185 CRS REPORTS ON STATUS OF IRS RESTRUCTURING, supra note 172. 
186 Id.  Then-Senator David Pryor (D-AR), who headed the Oversight Subcommittee of the Senate 
Finance Committee, was also involved.  See Daniel L. McClain, United States v. Leach and Internal Revenue 
Code Section 7521(c): Applying A Text-Based Analysis to Provisions of the Tax Code, 77 IOWA L. REV. 371, 
372 (1991) (describing the “horror stories” of IRS abuse that were revealed during hearings conducted by 
Senator David Pryor). 
187 McClain, supra note 186, at 372 (describing the “horror stories” of IRS abuse that were revealed 
during hearings conducted by Senator David Pryor); Guttman, supra note 34, at 13 (“In 1987 and 1988, then-
Senator David Pryor, who was head of the Finance Committee’s Oversight subcommittee, held hearings on 
taxpayer problems in dealing with the IRS.”).  Senator Roth also co-authored a provocatively titled book.  See 
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR. & WILLIAM H. NIXON, THE POWER TO DESTROY: HOW THE IRS BECAME AMERICA’S 
MOST POWERFUL AGENCY, HOW CONGRESS IS TAKING CONTROL, AND WHAT YOU CAN DO TO PROTECT 
YOURSELF UNDER THE NEW LAW (1999).  The dust jacket states, in part, “In 1997 William Roth . . . initiated 
an investigation into the IRS and chaired congressional hearings that uncovered horrifying stories of abuses 
against taxpayers that shocked the nation.”  Id. (front dust jacket). 
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to be left out,188 held similar hearings.189  The House actively solicited these tales.  In a 
theatrical move, it opened a website on the symbolic date of Halloween, linked to the House 
Republican Conference’s website, expressly “to collect taxpayer horror stories.”190  Ryan 
J. Donmoyer quoted Rep. John Boehner, then-Chair of the House Republican Conference, 
as stating, “This Halloween, the Republican Congress is unmasking the IRS for what it 
really is: a bureaucratic monster stalking the American taxpayer.”191 
The hearings received extensive media coverage, 192  with some broadcast on 
national television193 and featuring IRS employees testifying behind screens to hide their 
identities, implying that they feared imminent retaliation. 194   Representative Michael 
Forbes (NY)195 made that link as vivid as possible, stating, “We saw current and former 
IRS agents who had to testify in secret because they feared for their lives.”196 
Congress apparently carefully selected its witnesses.197  They included “Lawrence 
Ballweg, an angry 79-year-old priest, [who] alleged that while administering his mother’s 
estate, the IRS improperly assessed him personally more than $18,000 in taxes.”198  The 
owner of a Virginia restaurant called “The Jewish Mother,” John Colaprete, detailed a raid 
involving armed agents “pulling his manager’s [teenaged] daughter out of a shower at 
gunpoint.”199 
Some used the rhetoric of criminal law, not just to refer to how the IRS allegedly 
treated taxpayers, but also how the IRS should be treated.  For example, Representative 
Forbes stated: 
We saw a government agency totally out of control, lacking 
accountability, an agency where one is guilty until proven innocent. 
                                                      
188 Alexander, supra note 178, at 299 (stating that “[t]he Ways and Means Committee, not to be left 
behind, promptly took up the restructuring commission’s bill and made it much stricter . . .”). 
189 See Taxpayer Rights: Written Comment and Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the 
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 12 (1997) (statement of Rep. Bill Archer) (“[T]here are too 
many instances in which taxpayers are denied their fundamental rights.  Money is coerced from people who 
do not owe it.  And the defenseless and the weak can become IRS targets.”). 
190 Ryan J. Donmoyer, GOP Opens IRS Horror Story Web Site, 77 TAX NOTES 667, 667 (1997). 
191 Id. 
192 See Lederman, supra note 37, at 1010 (discussing the media’s focus on horror stories and the 
need to reform the IRS); see also Thorndike, supra note 150, at 774 (“The hearings drew widespread media 
coverage.”). 
193 See Donmoyer, supra note 175, at 1655 (“By the end of the high-profile Senate Finance 
Committee oversight hearings on alleged IRS abuses of taxpayers, the agency was issuing apologies to 
taxpayers who related their horror stories on live television and promising to clean up its act.  Again.”). 
194 Thorndike, supra note 150, at 774. 
195 Mr. Forbes was a member of the Republican Party until July 17, 1999, when he switched to the 
Democratic Party.  Rep. Forbes Loses Aides Over Switch to Democrats, L.A. TIMES (July 20, 1999), http:// 
articles.latimes.com/1999/jul/20/news/mn-57768 [https://perma.cc/8E8L-3DD4]. 
196 JOINT REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC PLANS AND BUDGET OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, AS 
REQUIRED BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, JCS-4-99, at 9 
(May 25, 1999) (opening statement of Rep. Forbes) (emphasis added), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html 
?func=startdown&id=2912 [https://perma.cc/EQ93-8MSN] [hereinafter Opening Statement of Rep. Forbes]. 
197 See Spellman, supra note 16, at 1854 (former IRS Commissioner Mortimer Caplin said at a 
conference, “Roth ‘brought six people up—these miserable collection cases.  He had studied thousands and 
thousands of cases and came up with six extreme charges against the IRS.’”). 
198 Leslie Book, The New Collection Due Process Taxpayer Rights, 86 TAX NOTES 1127, 1127 
(2000). 
199 Id.  See also Ryan J. Donmoyer, Judge May Dismiss Jewish Mother Lawsuit, 83 TAX NOTES 
1696, 1696 (1999). 
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 We saw and heard all this and we acted to put a stop to it. . . .  
 In a sense, the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform 
Act put the IRS on probation.200 
The hearings effectively put the IRS on trial201 but, largely because Congress—
perhaps intentionally—did not obtain waivers from the witnesses202 of their statutory right 
to confidentiality of their tax return information,203 the IRS was essentially a voiceless and 
thus helpless defendant.204  In fact, the bona fides of many of the shocking stories told at 
the IRS hearings are questionable.  John Colaprete famously “has ‘recanted all this—he 
happened to be out of the country’ when this was said to have occurred.”205  The GAO 
ultimately found many of the witnesses’ horror stories unfounded or exaggerated. 206  
However, that was after Congress enacted sweeping changes in the IRS Reform Act.207  
During the hearings that preceded the Act, many Congressmen were horrified by the 
witnesses’ testimony.208 
C. Alleged Targeting of Conservative Tax-Exempt Organizations 
In 1997, the heyday of IRS horror stories and Congressional hearings, the IRS 
encountered another problem: The press accused the IRS of targeting the applications for 
tax-exempt status of organizations perceived to be antithetical to the views of the Clinton 
Administration.209  The seven allegations included the following two: 
                                                      
200 Opening Statement of Rep. Forbes, supra note 196. 
201 See id. (“In 1997, Congress held a series of hearings where the American people saw the 
Internal Revenue Service almost literally on trial.  They saw a parade of witness [sic] come before Congress 
to testify about the naked abuse of power over at the Internal Revenue Service.”). 
202 See Alexander, supra note 178, at 299 (“Presumably aware that the IRS was powerless to 
respond or correct the record without waiver of the strict privacy rules under section 6103, the committee did 
not obtain waivers of confidentiality from the witnesses telling their lurid stories or give the IRS the right to 
respond.”).  Cf. George K. Yin, Reforming (and Saving) the IRS by Respecting the Public’s Right to Know, 
100 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1133 (2014) (noting that “[w]ith JCT [Joint Committee on Taxation] approval, the IRS 
has a limited ability to disclose return information in order to correct a misstatement of fact.  See I.R.C. 
§ 6103(k)(3).”). 
203 See I.R.C. § 6103. 
204 See, e.g., Donmoyer, supra note 175, at 1659 (referring to “a squabble [with Senator Roth] as 
[IRS Acting Commissioner Michael] Dolan declined to answer questions about the case because he said he 
did not have all of the necessary waivers required under the tax code’s confidentiality provisions.”); cf. 
Alexander, supra note 178, at 299 (“Perhaps under instructions to limit its response, the IRS made little effort 
to rebut claims of misdeeds or to explain its actions.”). 
205 Spellman, supra note 16, at 1854 (quoting former IRS Commissioner Mortimer Caplin).  See 
also Mom’s, Inc. v. Weber, 82 F. Supp. 2d 493, 524 & n.62 (E.D. Va. 2000), rev’d in part sub nom. Mom’s, 
Inc. v. Willman, 109 Fed. App’x 629 (4th Cir. 2004) (“While the restaurants were being searched, agents 
simultaneously searched the homes of [Jewish Mother manager Richard] Miller and Colaprete as well.  There 
was no one home at Colaprete’s house at the time of the search except Colaprete’s two dogs.  Colaprete was 
in Jamaica at the time. . . .”). 
206 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF IRS TAXPAYER ABUSE (May 24, 
1999), LEXIS, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 80-13.  The Webster Commission similarly found, “there was no 
pattern of misuse by the CID of search warrants, grand juries, informants, or undercover operators, although 
there were ‘one or two isolated abuses.’”  Spellman, supra note 16, at 1855. 
207 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685. 
208 CRS REPORTS ON STATUS OF IRS RESTRUCTURING, supra note 172. 
209 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION MATTERS, JCS-3-00, at 12 (Mar. 
2000), http://www.jct.gov/s-3-00.pdf [https://perma.cc/L68C-3DCL] (“[A]llegations were made through 
certain media reports that the IRS was engaged in politically targeted examinations of tax-exempt 
organizations.”). 
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 (1) [T]he IRS delayed or refused to issue determination letters to 
certain organizations either because the organization was perceived to 
represent views that were opposed to the Clinton Administration or 
because individual IRS employees were opposed to the views of the 
organization; [and] 
 (2) [T]he IRS inappropriately granted determination letters or 
expedited the granting of determination letters for organizations whose 
political views were in line with those of the Clinton Administration 
. . . .210 
At the request of Senator Roth and others, the Joint Committee on Taxation 
investigated the allegations and issued a report.211  It found no evidence to support the 
allegations. 212   Instead, the Joint Committee found that, for technical reasons, some 
determination letter applications took longer than others for the IRS to process.  
Specifically, those that were not “approved by a technical screener on the basis of 
information contained in the application” and those that were forwarded to the IRS’s 
National Office in Washington, D.C. took much longer.213 
The report also found no evidence that the screening process was used selectively 
or in a manner intended to subject organizations with views contrary to the Clinton 
Administration to more scrutiny.214 According to the report, although determination-letter 
applications followed different paths, these differences were not politically motivated. 
Rather, they resulted from: 
(1) [D]ifferences in the statements made by organizations on their 
determination letter applications as to the organizations’ purposes, (2) the 
failure of IRS employees to understand the circumstances under which 
determination letter applications should be forwarded to the IRS National 
Office, and (3) differences in information provided to the IRS relating to 
potential operations of the organizations in question.215 
However, the report noted its concern that the different paths the applications took could 
create the appearance of bias.216 
The Joint Committee determined that “the move by the IRS to centralize the 
processing of determination letter requests in a single IRS Key District Office may address 
certain of the problems identified by the Joint Committee staff.”217  Ironically, sixteen years 
later, TIGTA found that IRS employees in that office in Cincinnati had created exactly the 
problem the Joint Committee thought in 2000 a centralized office would solve.218 
IV. IRS REFORM IN CONTROVERSY 
                                                      
210 Id. at 12–13. 
211 Id. at 1. 
212 Id. at 14–15. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 15. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 16. 
217 Id. 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 91–93.  In fact, the 1998 reform may have contributed to the 
problem because “[f]ollowing reorganization, many highly trained lawyers in Washington who previously 
handled the most sensitive nonprofit applications were reassigned to focus on special projects . . . .”  Barker 
& Elliot, supra note 79 (reporting statement of Paul Streckfus, a former IRS attorney). 
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It is too soon to tell what the long-term effect on the IRS will be from the recent 
Congressional hearings and 2015 IRS reform legislation.  However, the outcome of the 
1998 IRS reform, which followed similarly inflammatory hearings, may provide some 
useful lessons.  Before turning to the IRS reforms Congress made at the end of 2015, the 
next Section examines the effects of the 1998 IRS reform. 
A. The 1998 Reform 
Not surprisingly, the highly publicized 1997 and 1998 hearings, with their 
allegations of shocking abuses perpetrated by the IRS, resulted in strong public support for 
major changes in IRS procedures and operations.219  The hearings deeply embarrassed the 
IRS and “did little to assure respect for either the income tax or the agency assigned to 
collect it.” 220   The hearings also proved very profitable for Republicans, “attracting 
attention and campaign contributions.” 221   They also resulted in the creation of a 
commission, headed by William Webster, to investigate the Criminal Investigation 
Division of the IRS.222 
1. Changes Made by the IRS Reform Act 
The IRS Reform Act itself did many things.  First and foremost, it required the IRS 
to undertake a major structural reorganization, moving from a geography-based structure 
to one organized into four operating divisions based on taxpayer groups.223  This aligned 
with the vision of the incoming IRS Commissioner, Charles Rossotti.224  The 1998 Act also 
enacted the Taxpayer Bill of Rights III, which has over seventy provisions, including 
restrictions on certain tax collections;225 and created a statutory list of “Ten Deadly Sins” 
for which an IRS employee would be fired.226 
The IRS Reform Act also established two new IRS oversight bodies, the IRS 
Oversight Board and TIGTA,227 bringing the total number of non-Congressional IRS watch 
                                                      
219 Albert B. Crenshaw, Senate Passes IRS Overhaul, WASH. POST, May 8, 1998, at A01, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/tax/stories/irs050898.htm [https://perma.cc/S4ER-WPAV]. 
220 Guttman, supra note 34, at 13. 
221 Senate Panel Hears Stories of Alleged IRS Abuses, ALL POLITICS (Apr. 28, 1998), http://www 
.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/04/28/irs.hearings [https://perma.cc/Z6LM-CWWJ]. 
222 See Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1144 
n.144 (2003) (discussing William Webster’s report, which found that “no evidence of systematic or repeated 
disclosure violations by the IRS Criminal Division existed”).  For the report, see WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, 
REVIEW OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE’S CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION (April 1999), http:// 
permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps19053/27623d99.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9BD-YFF8]. 
223 Thorndike, supra note 150, at 775–76.  The geography-based structure that existed prior to the 
1998 reform was the result of the previous restructuring, in 1952.  Id. at 762.  Before that, the IRS had been 
organized by type of tax.  Id. 
224 Statement of Charles O. Rossotti, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Before the Senate Finance 
Committee, January 28, 1998, at 12, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 28, 1998), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
news/ir-98-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW6X-68VV] (“[O]ne logical way to organize the IRS is into four units, 
each charged with end-to-end responsibility for serving a particular group of taxpayers with similar needs.”). 
225 Thorndike, supra note 150, at 775–76.  For examples of such restrictions, see Pub. L. No. 105-
206, 112 Stat. at 758–63 §§ 3421 (“Approval Process for Liens, Levies, and Seizures”), 3433 (“Levy 
Prohibited During Pendency of Refund Proceedings”), 3441 (“Prohibition of Sales of Seized Property at Less 
Than Minimum Bid”), 3445 (“Procedures for Seizure of Residences and Businesses”). 
226 Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1203, 112 Stat. at 720–22; see also Lederman, supra note 37, at 981. 
227 See IRS Oversight Bd., FAQ, Q&A 1, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/IRSOB 
/faqs/Pages/default.aspx#Q1 [https://perma.cc/ARZ2-GQWF]; TIGTA, Home Page, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta [https://perma.cc/WED4-YS3Z] (“The Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration (TIGTA) was established under the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 to provide 
independent oversight of IRS activities.”) [hereinafter TIGTA, Home Page]. 
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dogs to nine.228  TIGTA’s website states that it was established, among other things, “to 
provide independent oversight of IRS activities” and to prevent “fraud, waste, and abuse 
within the IRS and related entities.”229  It was TIGTA’s 2013 report that gave rise to the 
501(c)(4) controversy.230 
The 1998 Act also took a few steps to address the technology problems that served 
as the initial catalyst for reform.231  Commissioner Rossotti was particularly concerned 
about the technology issue.232  Under Rossotti’s leadership, the IRS launched a computer 
modernization effort, outsourcing the project to Computer Sciences Corp. (CSC) in 
1999.233  However, at a 2004 congressional hearing, testimony suggested that although the 
modernization project had produced some results, it had been beset with “significant delays 
and cost over-runs.”234  In the same year, then-Commissioner Rossotti admitted in an 
                                                      
228 The IRS lists its non-Congressional oversight organizations as including the following eight 
entities: (1) the GAO; (2) the Office of Management and Budget; (3) TIGTA; (4) the Electronic Tax 
Administration Advisory Committee (ETAAC); (5) the Information Reporting Program Advisory Committee 
(IRPAC); (6) Internal Revenue Service Advisory Council (IRSAC); (7) the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (TAP); 
and (8) the IRS Oversight Board.  Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Oversight Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Oversight-Organizations [https://perma.cc/A7KF-4FVP] (last updated 
Feb. 23, 2015) (listing ETAAC, IRPAC, IRSAC, TAP, and the IRS Oversight Board as “Advisory/Advocacy 
Organizations”).  The National Taxpayer Advocate also exercises an oversight function.  See Samuel D. 
Brunson, Watching the Watchers: Preventing I.R.S. Abuse of the Tax System, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 223, 245 
(2013) (“The principal oversight mechanisms Congress has established [for the IRS] are the Office of the 
Taxpayer Advocate and the Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board.”).  The IRS Oversight Board is now 
largely defunct because the U.S. Senate has not filled vacancies on the Board, so it does not currently have 
enough members to constitute a quorum.  See U.S. Treasury, IRS Oversight Board, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/AB85-G9L6].  However, other oversight 
bodies are quite active.  For example, the GAO released at least 15 reports on the IRS from January to 
September 2015.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Search for “IRS”, http://www.gao.gov/search 
?rows=10&now_sort=score+desc&page_name=main&search_type=Solr&o=0&path=&facets=&adv_begin_
date=&adv_end_date=&adv=0&advanced=&q=irs [https://perma.cc/AB85-G9L6].  During the same 9-
month period in 2015, TIGTA released at least 47 audit reports.  TIGTA, Audit Reports: FY – 2015, DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/oa_auditreports_fy15.shtml [https://perma.cc/Z2XU-3NKY] 
(last updated Oct. 15, 2015). 
229 TIGTA, Home Page, supra note 227 (also stating that it was established to “promote[] the 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the internal revenue laws”). 
230 See supra Part II. 
231 The IRS Reform Act amended Code section 7802 to provide that members of the IRS Oversight 
Board would be selected on the basis of factors including their professional experience and expertise in the 
area of information technology.  Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, § 1101(a).  It amended section 7803 to require TIGTA to annually evaluate the 
“adequacy and security” of IRS technology.  Id. § 1102(a).  It also instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to 
convene an electronic commerce advisory group to advise on the development of e-filing.  Id. § 2001(b)(2).  
In addition, it required the Joint Committee on Taxation to report annually between 1998 and 2004 on the 
status of the IRS technology modernization project.  Id. § 4002. 
232 Karen Kaplan, Bringing the IRS Into the 21st Century, L.A. TIMES (June 27, 1999), http:// 
articles.latimes.com/1999/jun/27/business/fi-50556 [https://perma.cc/P2UY-MZW8] (discussing how 
Commissioner Rossotti’s technological “vision represents a dramatic change from the hodgepodge of 
computer systems that store taxpayer records today”). 
233 Id. (stating below the headline, “Computer Sciences embarks on modernizing the computer 
systems that enable the agency to collect $1.7 trillion and deal with its millions of taxpaying ‘customers.’”). 
234 IRS Efforts to Modernize its Computer Systems: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Oversight of 
the Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. (2004) (Statement of Rep. Amo Houghton, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on Oversight), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg93550/html/CHRG-108hhrg93550.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8DWC-4A7N]. 
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interview that IRS computer modernization remained a “serious problem.”235  The IRS has 
not made significant strides in this regard since, as discussed below.236 
2. The Fallout of the 1998 Reform 
One result of the IRS Reform Act was a sharp downturn in collection activity for 
several years.  Audit rates, tax lien filings, levy notices served on third parties, and 
seizures237 all dropped dramatically starting around the 1998 fiscal year, as shown in Table 
1.238  In addition, as Professor Leslie Book has explained, in 1999, the IRS started to defer 
collection activity on billions of dollars in taxes, and, by September 2002, had deferred 
action on approximately one in three cases.239 
  
                                                      
235 Interview with Charles Rossotti, IRS Commissioner, on PBS Frontline (Feb. 19, 2004), http:// 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/interviews/rossotti.html [https://perma.cc/4MFN-8YBR].  In 
2007, the IRS recognized “limitations of [its] existing computer systems and technical infrastructure,” and 
detailed its information-technology development plan for the next several years.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
IT MODERNIZATION VISION & STRATEGY 6 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/mvs-10-07.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/AJ4Z-2MD6].  In 2012, the IRS discontinued its contract with CSC.  Jonathon O’Connell, 




236 See infra text accompanying notes 316–320. 
237 “In [Internal Revenue] Service jargon, a ‘seizure’ is what is done to something that can be sold, 
usually tangible realty or personalty, while a ‘levy’ is done to something that cannot be sold, generally 
intangible property such as payments due the taxpayer from a third party, or money.”  Bryan T. Camp, The 
Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84 IND. L.J. 57, 67 n.45 (2008). 
238 For similar statistics for fiscal years 2006 through 2014, see infra text accompanying note 249.  
For additional tables showing collection figures over a multi-year period spanning the enactment of the 1998 
Act, see Lederman, supra note 37, at 984–88. 
239 Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?, 
41 HOUS. L. REV. 1145, 1148 n.9 (2004). 
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Table 1: IRS Enforcement Statistics for Fiscal Years 1994–2005240 







Notices of Levy 
(rounded) 
Seizures 
1994 1.07% 813,000 2,935,000 10,000 
(rounded) 
1995 1.67% 799,000 2,722,000 11,000 
(rounded) 
1996 1.67% 750,000 3,109,000 10,000 
(rounded) 
1997 1.28% 544,000 3,659,000 10,090 
1998 0.99% 383,000 2,503,000 2,259 
1999 0.90% 168,000 504,000 161 
2000 0.49% 288,000 220,000 74 
2001 0.58% 428,000 447,000 255 
2002 0.57% 483,000 1,284,000 296 
2003 0.54% 544,000 1,681,000 399 
2004 0.62% 534,000 2,030,000 440 
2005 0.75% 523,000 2,744,000 512 
 
As this table reflects, the most dramatic decline was in seizures of property: The 
IRS went from approximately 10,000 seizures per year in the mid-1990s to just seventy-
four at the low point in 2000.  Seizures have never returned to their pre-1998 levels.241  
Although the drop in seizures was particularly dramatic, it is just part of a general picture 
of a reduction in IRS enforcement activities during this time period.  The perception that 
the IRS was toothless probably contributed to the proliferation of aggressive tax shelters in 
                                                      
240 For the sources of the Table’s statistics, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS - 
DELINQUENT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES - IRS DATA BOOK TABLE 16 (2002-2010), https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-
Tax-Stats-Delinquent-Collection-Activities-IRS-Data-Book-Table-16 [https://perma.cc/U2N5-4RLG]; 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS - EXAMINATION COVERAGE: RECOMMENDED AND AVERAGE 
RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL TAX AFTER EXAMINATION - IRS DATA BOOK TABLE 9A (2002), https://www.irs 
.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Examination-Coverage-Recommended-and-Average-Recommended-Additional-
Tax-After-Examination-IRS-Data-Book-Table-9a [https://perma.cc/8369-BTUA]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
SOI TAX STATS ARCHIVE - 1863 TO 1999 ANNUAL REPORTS AND IRS DATA BOOKS TABLE 11 (1995), https:// 
www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Archive-1863-to-1999-Annual-Reports-and-IRS-Data-Books [https://perma 
.cc/6YX7-4LT2]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS - DELINQUENT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES - IRS 
DATA BOOK TABLE 16 (1994-2001), https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Delinquent-Collection-
Activities-IRS-Data-Book-Table-16 [https://perma.cc/5G6M-96LU]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX 
STATS - 2003 IRS DATA BOOK - TABLE 10 (REVISED) (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03db10ex.xls; 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS - 2004 IRS DATA BOOK - TABLE 10 (REVISED) (2004), https://www 
.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04db10ex.xls; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS - 2005 IRS DATA BOOK - TABLE 
10 (REVISED) (2005), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05db10ex.xls; GOV’T ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO THE 
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
TAX ADMINISTRATION: AUDIT TRENDS AND RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS 18 tbl. I.1 (1996), http:// 
www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96091.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB2Y-C5RN]. 
241 See infra text accompanying note 249 (reporting seizure statistics for fiscal years 2006 through 
2014). 
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the late 1990s.242  David Cay Johnston has aptly described the IRS Reform Act as having 
“handcuffed the tax police.”243 
There were several reasons for the decline in IRS enforcement activity.  First, the 
restructuring itself took years and significant resources.244  Second, the IRS needed to shift 
substantial resources from collection to “customer service” to comply with the 
requirements of the Act.245  In part, it detailed employees from enforcement to service 
positions,246 resulting in a substantial reallocation of staff from enforcement to service for 
several years.247  Third, some collections employees feared the strict penalty of the Ten 
Deadly Sins and found it safer to do nothing than to try to collect taxes from recalcitrant 
taxpayers.248 
Subsequently, there was an uptick in enforcement during the 2009 through 2011 
fiscal years, then enforcement statistics began declining again.  Those statistics are not only 
at lower levels than they were in 2006, as shown in the next table, they are below where 
they were in the mid-1990s, before the IRS Reform Act.249 
  
                                                      
242 See TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, 
AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY 244 (2014) (noting that IRS reform “created an environment in which any 
attempt to identify and challenge tax shelters would run into both resource constraints and concern about 
engaging in activity that could anger taxpayers and get the agency hauled before Congress once again”); id. at 
331 (“Treasury officials were preoccupied with dealing with a hostile Congress and attempting to modernize 
IRS operations. . . . For some tax professionals involved in shelter activity, the fact that shelters were low on 
the government’s priority list meant that they were not going to be caught if they engaged in promoting 
highly questionable deals.”). 
243 DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO 
BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE 150 (2003). 
244 See William Hoffmann, 15 Years After RRA ‘98: Time to Re-restructure the IRS?, 140 TAX 
NOTES 647 (2013) (describing how the process took years, as each new division and function “stood up” at 
different times). 
245 Patti Mohr, Compliance Problems Top Priority, Rossotti Says, 91 TAX NOTES 206, 206 (2001) 
(“The agency’s ability to enforce compliance fell [in 2000] because of a long-term decline in staffing and a 
shift toward staffing customer service positions.”). 
246 See JAMES R. WHITE, GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-02-674, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: IMPACT OF COMPLIANCE AND COLLECTION PROGRAM DECLINES ON TAXPAYERS (May 22, 
2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 126-60 (“In response to the . . . demands, and with a declining pool of staff 
resources, IRS reallocated staff from compliance (other than returns processing) and collection programs to 
provide additional support to taxpayer assistance services.”). 
247 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT: ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN 
COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2001, Ref. No. 2002-30-184, at 14 (Sept. 2002).  A staff 
year is 2000 hours.  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT: THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE’S RESPONSE TO THE FALLING LEVEL OF INCOME TAX EXAMINATIONS AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON 
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE, Ref. No. 2002-30-092, at 9 n.9 (June 2002) (reporting such reallocation of 265 
staff years in 1997; 491 in 1998; 755 in 1999; and 974 in 2000). 
248 See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, NO. JCX-53-03, REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 45 (2003), http://www.jct 
.gov/x-53-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/444X-7LS8] (“The IRS reports that since enactment of section 1203, IRS 
employees frequently report that fear of a section 1203 allegation causes reluctance to take appropriate 
enforcement actions.”).  See also Hoffman, supra note 244 (“‘[N]ot only did you have the prohibition on 
using enforcement statistics to evaluate employees, but you also had these 10 deadly sins where the 
employees were very concerned that if they tried to do their job or they tried to take enforcement, then an 
allegation would be made about them and they would be fired,’ according to a senior TIGTA official.”). 
249 See supra text accompanying note 238. 
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Table 2: IRS Enforcement Statistics for Fiscal Years 2006–2014250 







Notices of Levy Seizures 
2006 0.80% 629,813 3,742,276 590 
2007 0.90% 683,659 3,757,190 676 
2008 1.00% 768,168 2,631,038 610 
2009 1.00% 965618 3,478,181 581 
2010 1.11% 1,096,376 3,606,818 605 
2011 1.11% 1,042,230 3,748,884 776 
2012 1.03% 707,768 2,961,162 773 
2013 0.96% 602,005 1,855,095 547 
2014 0.86% 535,580 1,995,987 432 
 
B. The 2015 Legislative Reforms 
Congress followed up the inflammatory hearings that began in 2013 with 
legislation at the end of 2015.  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, contained 
various restrictions on the IRS, including a subtitle termed “Internal Revenue Service 
Reforms,” part of the included PATH Act of 2015.251  Although some reforms focused on 
other issues,252 several of the reforms focus on issues aired in Congressional hearings, 
including alleged “targeting” by the IRS based on political views. 
In particular, the PATH reforms include an amendment to the Ten Deadly Sins, 
for which the sanction is termination of employment, to add to the tenth sin a prohibition 
of “performing, delaying, or failing to perform (or threatening to perform, delay, or fail to 
perform) any official action (including any audit) with respect to a taxpayer for purpose of 
extracting personal gain or benefit or for a political purpose.”253  This amendment directly 
links the 2015 reform to a provision of the 1998 IRS reform that was widely criticized as 
deterring IRS collection employees from doing their job.254 
                                                      
250 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS - DELINQUENT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES - IRS DATA 
BOOK TABLE 16, https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Delinquent-Collection-Activities-IRS-Data-Book-
Table-16 [https://perma.cc/UM7S-BHSQ] (individual spreadsheets for 2011-2014 and combined spreadsheet 
for 2002-2010); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS EXAMINATION COVERAGE: INDIVIDUAL INCOME 
TAX RETURNS EXAMINED - IRS DATA BOOK TABLE 9B, https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Examination-
Coverage-Individual-Income-Tax-Returns-Examined-IRS-Data-Book-Table-9b [https://perma.cc/7Z8R-
QNFG] (individual spreadsheets for 2008-2014); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS - 2007 IRS 
DATA BOOK - TABLE 9 (REVISED), https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats---2007-IRS-Data-Book---Table-9-
(Revised) [https://perma.cc/M465-3DVJ]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS - 2006 IRS DATA BOOK 
- TABLE 10 (REVISED) (2006), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06db10revised.xls. 
251 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. Q, tit. IV, subtit. A (2015), 
https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr2029/BILLS-114hr2029enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUX5-8E7T]. 
252 For example, the PATH Act allows victims of IRS wrongdoing, such as unauthorized disclosure 
of confidential tax information, to find out facts such as whether the case has been referred to the Department 
of Justice for criminal prosecution.  Id. § 403. 
253 Id. § 407. 
254 See Barton Massey, Uncertainty, “Deadly Sins” Sink Morale at IRS, Ex-Official Claims, 85 
TAX NOTES 1364, 1364 (1999); supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
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The 2015 appropriations law also includes a restriction on using funds made 
available in the bill “to target citizens of the United States for exercising any right 
guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States”255 and a 
similar prohibition on the use of such funds “to target groups for regulatory scrutiny based 
on their ideological beliefs.”256  The wording of these reforms could suggest that Congress 
believes that the IRS engaged in politically motivated targeting despite the findings of the 
DOJ, FBI, and TIGTA.257 
The PATH Act reforms also include several sections applicable to tax-exempt 
organizations.  One of these is the provision mentioned above,258  which provides an 
expedited process for determination of exempt status under section 501(c)(4).259  It requires 
nonprofits seeking exemption under Code section 501(c)(4) to file a one-page notice of 
registration within 60 days after the organization is formed.260  That provision also requires 
the IRS to respond within 60 days acknowledging receipt of the form.261 
The new process seems directed at the IRS’s delays in approving the applications 
of potentially political groups.  It adopts a different approach than the IRS did to expediting 
applications.262  The one-page notice apparently is not intended to allow the IRS to vet the 
organization’s qualification under Code section 501(c)(4).  Instead, the new law requires 
the organization to submit with its first return such information as the IRS may require to 
support the organization’s claim to exemption under section 501(c)(4). 263   The new 
procedure will thus generally delay consideration of the organization’s qualifications until 
after the organization files its first return. 
The new law also creates some rights for tax-exempt organizations.  One provision 
requires the IRS to create a procedure under which an organization facing a determination 
that it fails to qualify (or to continue to qualify) as tax-exempt under section 501(c) may 
appeal to the IRS Appeals Office.264  This creates a procedural right in the form of an 
administrative appeal.  Another provision allows section 501(c)(4) and other exempt 
organizations to seek a declaratory judgment in federal court regarding their initial 
qualification or revocation of tax-exempt status.265  This is an extension of a provision 
applicable to other tax-exempt organizations, such as 501(c)(3) organizations.266  The 
declaratory judgment procedure requires exhaustion of administrative remedies.267 
The bill also contains a moratorium during 2016 on issuing or revising “guidance 
not limited to a particular taxpayer relating to the standard which is used to determine 
whether an organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare for 
                                                      
255 Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. E, tit. I, § 107 (2015). 
256 Id. § 108. 
257 See supra text accompanying notes 138–141. 
258 See supra text accompanying note 149. 
259 Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. Q, tit. IV, subtit. A, § 405 (2015) (“Organizations Required To Notify 
Secretary Of Intent To Operate Under 501(c)(4)”). 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 See supra text accompanying notes 145–146. 
263 Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. Q, tit. IV, subtit. A, § 405(b) (2015). 
264 Id. § 404.  Another reform in the PATH Act provides that the federal gift tax does not apply to 
transfers to 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5), and 501(c)(6) organizations.  Id. div. Q, tit. IV, subtit. A, § 408. 
265 Id. § 406. 
266 See I.R.C. § 7428(a)(1)(A) (2012) (referring to “an actual controversy . . . with respect to the 
initial qualification or continuing qualification of an organization as an organization described in section 
501(c)(3)”). 
267 Id. § 7428(b)(2). 
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purposes of section 501(c)(4).”268  The bill further provides that the standards as in effect 
on January 1, 2010 are to apply.269  Congress has imposed moratoria on the development 
of substantive law in the past.270  Such restrictions may impose difficulties on the IRS, such 
as “undermining public confidence in the fairness of the tax laws.”271 
The PATH Act also prohibits IRS employees from using personal email accounts 
for government business. 272   Lois Lerner apparently had done so. 273   A report 
accompanying H.R. 1152 stated: “Notwithstanding internal IRS policy, the Committee’s 
investigation of the agency’s targeting practices revealed that the former Director of the 
IRS Exempt Organizations Division, Lois Lerner, among others, conducted official 
business involving taxpayer information, using a personal email account.”274  The report 
explained that IRS policies restrict the use of personal email accounts because of concerns 
about IRS accountability and the confidential and sensitive nature of IRS information.275  
Nonetheless, because the Committee was concerned that IRS employees continued to use 
personal email accounts for official business in spite of IRS policy, “a statutory ban on use 
of nongovernmental email accounts by IRS employees conducting official business is 
necessary.”276  However, the PATH Act fails to provide a penalty for violation of the 
prohibition.277 
The PATH Act reforms also include codification of the Bill of Rights the IRS 
adopted in 2014, in that the PATH Act requires the Commissioner of the IRS to “ensure 
that employees of the Internal Revenue Service are familiar with and act in accord with 
taxpayer rights” that include the ten listed.278  These rights include such things as “The 
Right to Be Informed” and “The Right to Quality Service.”279  These statutory rights are 
different than the provisions Congress included in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights III, which 
was part of the IRS Reform Act and generally related to procedural issues. 280   The 
                                                      
268 Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. E., tit. I, § 127.  In 2013, Treasury had proposed a regulation 
attempting to provide more definitive guidance on what constitutes political activity that does not promote 
social welfare.  See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) & (iii), 78 Fed. Reg. 71535–42 (Nov. 29, 
2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-11-29/pdf/2013-28492.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3CM-
QMES]. 
269 Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. E., tit. I, § 127. 
270 See Archie Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 
YALE L.J. 1360, 1370–72 (1980) (providing several examples). 
271 Id. at 1375. 
272 Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. Q, tit. IV, subtit. A, § 402 (2015) (“No officer or employee of the 
Internal Revenue Service may use a personal email account to conduct any official business of the 
Government.”). 
273 See Stephen Dinan, Lois Lerner Had Yet Another Private Email!, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/1/irs-reveals-another-private-email-account-for-lois/?page= 
all [https://perma.cc/5C2Z-N3ZY] (“Lois G. Lerner used yet another private email account to do government 
business, the IRS revealed in a court filing late Monday . . . . The lawyers withheld the name and address of 
the new account but said it’s different than the ‘Toby Miles’ account they revealed in a previous court filing 
last week.”). 
274 Report to Accompany H.R. 1152, IRS Email Transparency Act, 114 H. Rep. 69, 2 (2015). 
275 Id. at 4. 
276 Id. 
277 See Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. Q, tit. IV, subtit. A, § 402 (2015). 
278 Id. § 401; IRS Adopts “Taxpayer Bill of Rights;” 10 Provisions to be Highlighted on IRS.gov, in 
Publication 1, IR-2014-72 (June 10, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Adopts-Taxpayer-Bill-
of-Rights%3B-10-Provisions-to-be-Highlighted-on-IRSgov,-in-Publication-1 [https://perma.cc/W4TR-3JLF]. 
279 IRS Adopts “Taxpayer Bill of Rights, supra note 278. 
280 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, § 3000 (“This title may be cited as the ‘Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights 3’”; Title included such things as a new burden of proof statute, an increase in the dollar limit for U.S. 
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codification of rights recently adopted by the IRS means that Congress wanted to elevate 
those rights to statutory law, perhaps indicating that it did not want the IRS to have the 
power to change them. 
Although the main focus of the IRS controversy was the IRS treatment of 501(c)(4) 
organizations, TIGTA had also issued a negative report regarding the IRS’s spending on 
conferences and videos.281  Recent funding bills include restrictions on spending on those 
activities.  With respect to conferences, the funds Congress appropriated for 2015 and 2016 
cannot be spent on “conferences that do not adhere to the procedures, verification 
processes, documentation requirements, and policies issued by the Chief Financial Officer, 
Human Capital Office, and Agency-Wide Shared Services.”282  The appropriations bills for 
2014 through 2016 prohibit any use of the bill’s funding for IRS videos “unless the Service-
Wide Video Editorial Board determines in advance that making the video is appropriate, 
taking into account the cost, topic, tone, and purpose of the video.”283 
C. Political Reform 
A well-known problem with crisis-based reform is that it is ill-suited to 
deliberation and moderation, so it is prone to producing an overcorrection.284  The 1998 
IRS reform manifested that tendency in such things as the Ten Deadly Sins, which 
reportedly chilled IRS employee motivation to collect taxes.285 
IRS reform following a perceived scandal is also likely to be focused on reining in 
the IRS, not on looking at the whole picture, including whether the IRS has sufficient 
funding to effectively carry out all of the duties Congress has given it.  As in 1998, 
Congress followed up the sensational IRS hearings of 2013 with cuts to an already 
declining IRS’s budget.286  Congress gave the IRS less funding for 2015 than it requested, 
less funding than it had the prior year, and less funding in absolute dollars than it had in 
2010.287  For 2016, Congress left the IRS’s base funding unchanged but added $290 million 
                                                      
Tax Court cases to be heard as small tax cases, and a new statute providing relief from joint and several 
liability for “innocent spouses.”). 
281 See supra note 39. 
282 Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. E, tit. I, § 109; Pub. L. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130, 2338-39, div. E, tit. I, 
§ 109. 
283 Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. E, § 105; Pub. L. 113-235, div. E, tit. I, § 105 (2014); Pub. L. 113-76, 
128 Stat. 5, 190 div. E, tit. I, § 105 (2014).  The IRS created the Service-Wide Video Editorial Board in 
February 2013.  TIGTA, REVIEW OF SB/SE CONFERENCE, supra note 39, at 15 (IRS Management’s Response 
to TIGTA Recommendation 6). 
284 Cf. Dodd-Frank Act and Regulatory Overreach: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (prepared Statement of Paul G. Mahoney) (discussing the perils of 
crisis-based financial reform); J.R. Spencer, Legislate in Haste, Repent at Leisure, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 19, 19 
(2010) (“In response to Monday’s ‘scandal’ comes Tuesday’s ministerial ‘pledge’ and on Wednesday this is 
followed by an instant Bill, rushed through Parliament with inadequate debate.”). 
285 See Massey, supra note 254. 
286 See infra note 291 for figures on the IRS’s budget in absolute dollars, which show a decline 
after 1995 each year through 1998. 
287 See IRS Must Use Resources More Efficiently, Inspector General Says, 15 TAX NOTES TODAY 
38–42 (Feb. 25, 2015) (“In FY 2014, the IRS budget was approximately $11.3 billion in appropriated 
resources, $850 million less than its FY 2010 level. . . . The IRS’s approved budget for FY 2015 was further 
reduced to $10.9 billion, resulting in a cut of approximately $346 million in appropriated resources from FY 
2014.”). 
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directed to taxpayer services, prevention of tax refund fraud, and enhanced 
cybersecurity.288  This did not bring the IRS’s funding even up to its 2014 level.289 
In inflation-adjusted dollars, the IRS’s 2015 budget was approximately eighteen 
percent lower than it was in 2010.290  In fact, in inflation-adjusted dollars, the IRS’s budget 
is comparable to 1998. 291   In 2014, the Internal Revenue Service Advisory Council 
                                                      
288 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113 tit. IV, div. E, tit. I, § 113; see also 
House Appropriations Committee, FY 2016 Omnibus – Financial Services Appropriation, http:// 
appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/12.15.15_fy_2016_omnibus_-_financial_services_-_summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9J8M-G59C] (“The legislation includes the 2015 level of $10.9 billion for base IRS 
activities, but provides an additional $290 million targeted solely for taxpayer services . . . . In total, this is a 
reduction of $1.7 billion from the President’s request for the agency.”). 
289 The IRS’s 2016 budget is $11.235 billion ($290 million over its 2015 budget).  See Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. E, tit. I, § 113; see also House Appropriations 
Committee, FY 2016 Omnibus – Financial Services Appropriation, http://appropriations.house.gov 
/uploadedfiles/12.15.15_fy_2016_omnibus_-_financial_services_-_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/9J8M-
G59C].  The IRS’s budget for 2014 was slightly higher, at $11.291 billion.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 
BUDGET IN BRIEF FY 2015, at 1 (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/budget-in-brief 
/Documents/Treasury_FY_2015_BIB.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9YN-HRZN].  Its budget for 2015 was $10.945 
billion.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PROGRAM SUMMARY BY APPROPRIATIONS ACCOUNT AND BUDGET 
ACTIVITY 1 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/IRS%20Budget%20in%20Brief%20FY%202016 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8XB-KTCZ]. 
290 Chuck Marr et al., IRS Funding Cuts Continue to Compromise Taxpayer Service and Weaken 
Enforcement, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-
tax/irs-funding-cuts-continue-to-compromise-taxpayer-service-and-weaken-enforcement [https://perma.cc 
/GGE5-3T6R]. 
291 Written Testimony of John A. Koskinen, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Before the 
Senate Finance Committee on IRS Budget and Current Operations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Feb. 3, 2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/Written_Testimony_of_Commissioner_Koskinen_before_the_Senate 
_Finance_Committee_on_IRS_Budget_and_Current_Operations.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR37-3VCT]. 
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Fiscal Year 
IRS Budget (absolute dollars, 
in thousands) 
IRS Budget in Inflation-
Adjusted (2016) Dollars (in 
thousands) 
1994 $7,340,000 $11,743,554 
1995 $7,474,000 $11,628,396 
1996 $7,348,000 $11,104,472 
1997 $7,206,000 $10,645,619 
1998 $7,804,829 $11,353,441 
1999 $8,245,797 $11,735,709 
2000 $8,256,272 $11,368,484 
2001 $9,003,000 $12,060,510 
2002 $9,485,000 $12,501,378 
2003 $9,845,000 $12,686,727 
2004 $10,185,000 $12,784,413 
2005 $10,236,000 $12,427,385 
2006 $10,573,706 $12,436,220 
2007 $10,597,065 $12,118,532 
2008 $10,892,384 $11,995,672 
2009 $11,522,598 $12,735,028 
2010 $12,146,123 $13,207,522 
2011 $12,121,830 $12,777,772 
2012 $11,816,696 $12,203,579 
2013 $11,198,611 $11,398,300 
2014 $11,290,612 $11,308,497 
2015 $10,945,000 $10,949,341 
2016 $11,235,000 $11,235,000 
 
The IRS budget figures are from the following sources: U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-94-129, 
ANALYSIS OF IRS’ BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995, at 8 (1994), http://www.gao.gov/assets/220 
/219481.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY2C-5BN6] (1994 budget, rounded); IRS Budget Proposal for Fiscal Year 
1996 and 1995 Tax Return Filing Season: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 2–3 (1995), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-104hhrg90652/pdf 
/CHRG-104hhrg90652.pdf [https://perma.cc/99T7-YB52] (1995 budget, rounded); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., 
GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-97-66, IRS’ FISCAL YEAR 1997 SPENDING, 1997 FILING SEASON, AND FISCAL YEAR 1998 
BUDGET REQUEST 5 (1997), http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/106787.pdf [https://perma.cc/86BB-LTM5] 
(1996 and 1997 budgets, rounded); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-98-114, IRS’ FISCAL YEAR 
1999 BUDGET REQUEST AND FISCAL YEAR 1998 FILING SEASON 26 (1998), http://www.gao.gov/assets/110 
/107350.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7XN-CCNR] (1998 budget); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-99-
140, IRS’ FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET REQUEST AND 1999 TAX FILING SEASON 28 (1999), http://www.gao.gov 
/assets/110/107859.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC3B-LQN5] (1999 budget); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/T-
GGD/AIMD-00-133, IRS’ 2000 TAX FILING SEASON AND FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET REQUEST 24 (2000), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/108348.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9HC-BN2K] (2000 budget); U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREAS., THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 279, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2005-BUD 
/pdf/BUDGET-2005-BUD-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WWG-B26U] (2001 and 2003 budgets) (amounts 
rounded); U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 242, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg 
/BUDGET-2004-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2004-BUD-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/36FL-XW6Z] (2002 budget, 
rounded); U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 260, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg 
/BUDGET-2006-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2006-BUD-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4RP-J5UV] (2004 budget, 
rounded); U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 236, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg 
/BUDGET-2007-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2007-BUD-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAZ3-JZ8T] (2005 budget, 
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(IRSAC)292 said, “In IRSAC’s view, the IRS is in the midst of an existential funding 
crisis.”293 
The GAO reported that IRS budget cuts resulted in an 11 percent decline in staffing 
between 2010 and 2014, with most of the reduction in enforcement.294  TIGTA—the same 
organization that conducted the 2013 investigation into the IRS’s treatment of Tea Party 
groups—has reported that the reduction in the IRS’s budget of almost $1.2 billion (in 
absolute dollars) between 2010 and 2015295 resulted in a smaller work force,296 reduced tax 
collections, 297  reduced case closures by revenue officers, 298  and reduced service to 
                                                      
rounded); U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., BUDGET IN BRIEF FY 2008, at 1, https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/budget-
in-brief-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK77-4QBJ] (2006 budget); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-
07-719T, ASSESSMENT OF THE 2008 BUDGET REQUEST AND AN UPDATE OF 2007 PERFORMANCE 7, http://www 
.gao.gov/assets/120/116547.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VWB-L42F] (2007 budget); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., GAO-08-567, FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET REQUEST AND INTERIM PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF IRS’S 
2008 TAX FILING SEASON 16, http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/273727.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX9X-BSBN] 
(2008 budget); U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., BUDGET IN BRIEF FY 2011, at 65, https://www.treasury.gov/about 
/budget-performance/budget-in-brief/Documents/IRS%20FY11%20508.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4R8-3BUD] 
(2009 and 2010 budgets); U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., BUDGET IN BRIEF FY 2013, at 1, https://www.treasury.gov 
/about/budget-performance/budget-in-brief/Documents/11.%20IRS_508%20-%20passed.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/VJB6-65L3] (2011 and 2012 budgets); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. OVERSIGHT BD., FY 2015 IRS BUDGET 
RECOMMENDATION SPECIAL REPORT 19 (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/IRSOB/reports/Documents/IRSOB 
%20FY2015%20Budget%20Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL8H-USUC] [hereinafter IRS OVERSIGHT 
BOARD, FY 2015] (fiscal year 2013 budget after sequestration); U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., BUDGET IN BRIEF FY 
2015, at 61 (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/budget-in-brief/Documents/Treasury 
_FY_2015_BIB.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9YN-HRZN] (2014 budget); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PROGRAM 
SUMMARY BY APPROPRIATIONS ACCOUNT AND BUDGET ACTIVITY 1 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/PUP 
/newsroom/IRS%20Budget%20in%20Brief%20FY%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8XB-KTCZ] (2015 
budget); House Appropriations Committee, FY 2016 Omnibus – Financial Services Appropriation, http:// 
appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/12.15.15_fy_2016_omnibus_-_financial_services_-_summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9J8M-G59C] (2016 budget).  Inflation calculations were performed using US INFLATION 
CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com [https://perma.cc/T3FB-SPM3] (as of February 2016). 
292 IRSAC was “[c]hartered to convey the public’s perception of the Internal Revenue Service and 
its activities to the Commissioner . . . .”  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. ADVISORY COUNCIL, 2014 IRSAC 
GENERAL REPORT, https://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/2014-IRSAC-General-Report [https://perma.cc 
/RJ8K-7U3B] (last updated Oct. 6, 2015). 
293 Id. 
294 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-732, LARGE PARTNERSHIPS: WITH GROWING 
NUMBER OF PARTNERSHIPS, IRS NEEDS TO IMPROVE AUDIT EFFICIENCY 11 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets 
/670/665886.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6XR-H8Z5] [hereinafter GAO, IRS NEEDS TO IMPROVE AUDIT 
EFFICIENCY]. 
295 TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REDUCED BUDGETS AND COLLECTION RESOURCES 
HAVE RESULTED IN DECLINES IN TAXPAYER SERVICE, CASE CLOSURES, AND DOLLARS COLLECTED 1, DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY (May 8, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2015reports/201530035fr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4FN4-KER4] [hereinafter TIGTA, REDUCED BUDGETS].  The $1.2 billion reduction is more 
than a ten-percent decline in absolute dollars.  Id.  In inflation-adjusted dollars, the IRS’s funding in fiscal 
year 2015 is approximately seventeen percent below 2010.  See Catherine Rampel, As Congress Cripples the 
IRS, Tax Rates Are Likely to Rise, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions 
/catherine-rampell-as-congress-cripples-the-irs-tax-rates-are-likely-to-rise/2014/12/15/a7a30754-8476-11e4-
b9b7-b8632ae73d25_story.html [https://perma.cc/TM3A-JKAL] (citing data from the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities). 
296 See TIGTA, REDUCED BUDGETS, supra note 295, at 2 (noting that in fiscal year 2012, the IRS 
offered buyouts to 7,000 employees and 1,200 accepted, and that “[t]he IRS also instituted an ‘exception-
only’ hiring freeze, leaving many vacancies unfilled.”). 
297 Id. at 8. 
298 Id. at 13, 16. 
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taxpayers.299  Moreover, the IRS’s per-employee expenditure on employee training in 2014 
was less than 18 percent of what it was in 2010, in constant dollars.300 
The IRS is thus operating with a smaller workforce that also receives less training.  
Meanwhile, its workload has increased.  It is not only that the agency is dealing with new 
responsibilities such as those occasioned by the Affordable Care Act.301  The IRS also has 
more taxpayers to deal with.302  The number of individual tax returns filed increased by 6.6 
million returns (4.67 percent) between 2010 and 2014.303  Over the past twenty years, the 
number of returns filed by partnerships has increased 142 percent.304  From 2002 through 
2011, the number of S corporations increased 32 percent, the total number of partnerships 
grew by 47 percent—and the number of large partnerships grew 257 percent—while the 
number of C corporations decreased only 22 percent.305   GAO reported that the IRS 
conducts few audits of large partnerships, 306  despite their potential high risk of 
noncompliance.307 
The IRS is also combatting a troubling wave of identity theft tax refund fraud.308  
For example, the agency estimated that for 2013, it prevented approximately $24.2 billion 
in identity theft-based fraudulent refund claims but actually paid out $5.8 billion that it 
later determined had been fraudulently claimed.309  In fiscal year 2014, the IRS assigned 
                                                      
299 Id. at 10.  Reduced service includes increased telephone wait times.  Id. 
300 David Cay Johnston, The Cost of the Shrinking IRS Budget, 2015 TNT 105-11 (June 2, 2015) 
(“Adjusted to 2014 dollars, the IRS spent $1,926 on training per employee in 2010, but just $339 last year.”). 
301 See Bryan Camp, Overlooked Costs of IRS Budget Cuts Will Hit Taxpayers Hardest, THE 
CONVERSATION (April 14, 2015), http://theconversation.com/overlooked-costs-of-irs-budget-cuts-will-hit-
taxpayers-hardest-39762 [https://perma.cc/3J4P-LFZF] (“FY10 was . . . the year Congress really began piling 
on the acronymic workload: PPACA (the official acronym for Obamacare) and FATCA (which required the 
IRS to start investigating taxpayer foreign bank accounts).”). 
302 Since 1998, “the number of additional taxpayers the agency must help and oversee grew by 
some 16 million.”  Id. 
303 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS–VOL. 1, NAT’L TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE 9 (2014), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2014-Annual-Report 
/Volume-One.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS2Z-BQ76] (141.2 million individual tax returns were filed in fiscal 
year 2010, and 147.8 million filed in fiscal year 2014). 
304 Johnston, supra note 300. 
305 GAO, IRS NEEDS TO IMPROVE AUDIT EFFICIENCY, supra note 294, at 13–14 (2002 calculation 
performed by the author). 
306 Id. at 19 & n.24 (reporting a 4 percent audit rate when including “campus audits” and 0.8 
percent rate of audits that involve looking at the partnership’s books and records). 
307 Id. at 21.  In the 2015 budget bill, Congress changed the audit procedures for large partnerships, 
to try to facilitate these audits.  See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-74, tit. XI, § 1101; Michael 
Cohn, Budget Deal Makes It Easier for IRS to Audit Large Partnerships, ACCT. TODAY (Nov. 2, 2015), http:// 
www.accountingtoday.com/blogs/debits-credits/news/budget-deal-makes-it-easier-for-irs-to-audit-large-
partnerships-76285-1.html.  However, Congress did not provide additional funds for increased audits.  See 
generally Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. 
308 See IRS Intensifies Work on Identity Theft and Refund Fraud; Criminal Investigation 
Enforcement Actions Underway Across the Nation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www 
.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Intensifies-Work-on-Identity-Theft-and-Refund-Fraud%3B--Criminal-
Investigation-Enforcement-Actions-Underway-Across-the-Nation [https://perma.cc/W74V-FAM8]. 
309 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-119, IDENTITY THEFT AND TAX FRAUD: ENHANCED 
AUTHENTICATION COULD COMBAT REFUND FRAUD, BUT IRS LACKS AN ESTIMATE OF COSTS, BENEFITS AND 
RISKS (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667965.pdf [https://perma.cc/53DY-9WZ9] (GAO Highlights 
preceding page 1).  More recently, the IRS announced that from January through November of 2015, it halted 
processing of 4.8 million suspicious returns and rejected 1.4 million identity theft returns claiming a total of 
$8 billion.  States and Tax Industry Combat Identity Theft and Refund Fraud on Many Fronts, FS-2016-1, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS,-States-and-Tax-Industry-Combat-
Identity-Theft-and-Refund-Fraud-on-Many-Fronts [https://perma.cc/9NLG-35J2]. 
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3,000 employees to work on identity theft issues.310  Budget cuts have hindered the IRS in 
modernizing its fraud-detection systems, 311  however, so this remains an ongoing 
problem.312  Moreover, this problem not only burdens the federal fisc, it burdens the 
taxpayers whose identities were used to claim fraudulent refunds.313 
Budget insufficiencies may also exacerbate the IRS’s longstanding deficiencies in 
technology infrastructure.  Much of the IRS’s current technology expenditures are still used 
for upgrades to systems built in the 1950s and 1960s.314  A lot of its newer technology is 
outdated, too.  “Thousands of employees are still using the Windows XP operating system, 
which Microsoft no longer supports.”315 
IRS technology limitations pose real problems for tax administration and 
confidential taxpayer data.  A 2014 TIGTA report on the IRS’s information technology 
found weaknesses in programs relating to risk management and the protection of federal 
tax information, among other things. 316   It also found that while some of the IRS’s 
technology projects are on schedule and within budget, budget cuts may be negatively 
affecting other critical systems.317  The IRS requested $3.2 billion, about 23 percent of its 
2016 budget request, for information technology. 318   In its 2016 appropriations bill, 
                                                      
310 IRS Combats Identity Theft and Refund Fraud on Many Fronts, FS-2014-1, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Combats-Identity-Theft-and-Refund-Fraud-on-Many-Fronts-
2014 [https://perma.cc/DA7A-8765]. 
311 See Matt Hunter, Tax-Refund Fraud to Hit $21 Billion, And There's Little the IRS Can Do, 
CNBC (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/11/tax-refund-fraud-to-hit-21-billion-and-theres-little-
the-irs-can-do.html [https://perma.cc/4HLP-AVBE]. 
312 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 reflects concern about tax-related identity theft.  It 
requires at least $5 million of the $206 million given to Taxpayer Advocate Services be spent on identity 
theft casework.  Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. E, tit. I.  It also requires the IRS to “institute and enforce policies 
and procedures that will safeguard the confidentiality of taxpayer information and protect taxpayers against 
identity theft.”  Id. div. E, tit. I, § 103.  In addition, the PATH Act permits employers to use “identifying 
numbers” instead of Social Security numbers on W-2 forms.  Id. div. Q, tit. IV, subtit. A, § 409.  The 
intention seems to be to permit the use of truncated Social Security numbers: the heading of Section 409 of 
the bill is “Extend Internal Revenue Service Authority to Require Truncated Social Security Numbers on 
Form W–2.”  Id. 
313 See Steve Weisman, What the IRS Isn’t Telling You About Identity Theft, USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 
2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/2016/01/30/what-irs-isnt-telling-you-identity-theft 
/79306984 [https://perma.cc/YV9Z-DK56] (pointing out that, among the issues is the fact that, “[i]f you are 
the victim of income tax identity theft, it still takes an average of 278 days to resolve your claim and get your 
refund”). 
314 Jeanne Sahadi, IRS Says It’s Using Technology from JFK’s Time, CNN MONEY (Feb. 3, 2015, 
6:38 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/03/pf/taxes/irs-budget-cuts [https://perma.cc/A3AD-XK56]. 
315 David Sherfinksi, Technology Problems at IRS Go Far Beyond Loss of Lois Lerner’s Email, 
WASH. TIMES (July 2, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/2/technology-problems-at-irs-
goes-far-beyond-loss-of/?page=all [https://perma.cc/Y9TM-2DCW] (also reporting that “[t]he IRS has a 
backlog of up to $500 million in requested technology upgrades”). 
316 TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2014-20-095, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM i (2014) (Highlights), http://www 
.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2014reports/201420095fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/XLA5-VNXS]. 
317 Id. at 20.  TIGTA also expressed concern that the IRS’s existing fraud detection systems may be 
insufficient to detect fraud before the IRS issues claimed tax refunds.  Id. 
318 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., IRS IS SCALING BACK ACTIVITIES AND USING BUDGET 
FLEXIBILITIES TO ABSORB FUNDING CUTS 1 (June 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670969.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9TYQ-AVE9] (“IRS requested $3.2 billion for information technology (IT) investments.  This 
accounted for 23 percent of IRS’s budget request for fiscal year 2016.”). 
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Congress provided the IRS with $290 million for business systems modernization,319 a 
little more than 9 percent of the $3.2 billion the IRS requested.320 
Some in Congress have stated that the IRS budget cuts, which began in 2011,321 
are punishment for bad behavior.322  Regardless of the reason, it is very hard for any 
organization to run effectively when its funding drops suddenly and in unpredictable 
amounts.323  In 2014, the Taxpayer Advocate Service, whose role is to “ensure that every 
taxpayer is treated fairly,”324 identified the inadequate funding of the IRS as the number 
one most serious problem for taxpayers.325 
It may not be surprising that a Congress that has vilified the IRS in public hearings 
has also cut its budget.  In theory, IRS reform could give the IRS political support for a 
time, as seems to have happened in 1998.  But, in that situation, Congress portrayed the 
institution of the IRS as the villain, with a possible savior, Charles Rossotti, the new IRS 
Commissioner, waiting in the wings.326  Congress and the media viewed Mr. Rossotti as 
someone who could restructure the IRS to behave like a private-sector business.327  The 
                                                      
319 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 
div. E, tit. I.  The funds will remain available until September 30, 2018.  Id. 
320 Congress also required quarterly reports to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate and the Comptroller General of the United States regarding such things as the 
costs and schedules for the IRS’s major information technology investments.  Id. at 187–88. 
321 See TIGTA, REDUCED BUDGETS, supra note 295 (showing IRS expenditures over a period of 
years that includes 2011). 
322 For example, the 2015 report by the Committee on Ways and Means stated, after discussing IRS 
conference spending and the 501(c)(4) investigation, “As a result of the IRS’s blatant misconduct, Congress 
significantly reduced the agency’s budget.”  H.R. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, 
DOING LESS WITH LESS: IRS’S SPENDING DECISIONS HARM TAXPAYERS 2 (Apr. 22, 2015), http:// 
waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/4.22.15_Tax_Filing_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/49XM-WG8S]. 
323 Unlike a private-sector organization, the IRS cannot put aside funds for potential future lean 
years. 
324 Taxpayer Advocate Service, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Advocate [https:// 
perma.cc/SL2C-SCEK]. 
325 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS VOL. I, NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 
3 (2014), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2014-Annual-Report/Volume-One 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCW9-4HQP] [hereinafter NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT] 
(“As we begin 2015, the widening imbalance between the IRS’s increasing workload and its shrinking 
resources leads us to designate it the #1 problem for taxpayers.”).  The National Taxpayer Advocate 
identified insufficient IRS funding as the number 1 most serious problem in 2011, number 3 most serious 
problem in 2012, and number 2 most serious problem in 2013.  See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 
SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 59, at xi (referring to 2011 and 2012); TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., NATIONAL 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS, http://www 
.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/Most-Serious-Problems.html [https://perma.cc/YZ6J-2UEA] 
(listing the 10 most serious problems for 2013). 
326 Mr. Rossotti was IRS Commissioner from 1997 to 2002.  The Carlyle Group, Charles O. 
Rossotti, http://www.carlyle.com/about-carlyle/team/charles-o-rossotti [https://perma.cc/88MM-7WWW]. 
327 See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Nominee for I.R.S. Vows to Serve Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 
1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/24/us/nominee-for-irs-vows-to-serve-taxpayers.html [https://perma 
.cc/3SKZ-XYR9] (quoting Senator Roth as calling Rossotti a “successful businessman, in touch with the 
needs, concerns and risk-taking mindset of entrepreneurs” who made his mark as a “management consultant 
and expert on computer systems”); see also President William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Signing of IRS 
Reform Legislation (July 22, 1998), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/07/22/irs.signing/transcript 
.html [https://perma.cc/YDB2-5XDF] (praising Rossotti as a “seasoned private sector CEO” who could 
“reshape the agency, expanding office hours and phone hours, making it easier to file taxes over the 
telephone or by computer”).  Mr. Rossotti helped design the IRS’s new structure and emphasized the IRS 
mission of providing service to taxpayers.  See, e.g., Hal G. Rainey & James Thompson, Leadership and the 
Transformation of a Major Institution: Charles Rossotti and the Internal Revenue Service, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 
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present situation is quite different.  President Obama replaced the previous IRS 
Commissioner with John Koskinen, but Congress has not portrayed him as the IRS’s 
savior.  Instead, in October 2015, nineteen house Republicans, led by Rep. Jason Chaffetz 
(R-UT), filed a resolution seeking Commissioner Koskinen’s impeachment.328  The House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform alleged that Mr. Koskinen failed to 
preserve emails of Lois Lerner.329 
Ultimately, a core problem is that the IRS is an easy target for politicians.  
Opprobrium for tax collectors has a long history,330 although it is about as helpful as killing 
the messenger upon receiving bad news.331  Most people do not like to pay taxes, so it is 
rare for a politician to jump to the defense of the IRS.332  Politicians therefore have an 
opportunity both to criticize the IRS for simple political gain and to try to undermine the 
IRS as a way to undermine the effectiveness of a federal tax system they oppose.333 
                                                      
REV. 596 (2006) (arguing that Rossotti and his team implemented reforms that substantially improved 
taxpayer service and effective tax administration); Rossotti Appoints New IRS Team, J. ACCT. (Nov. 1, 1998), 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/1998/nov/rossottiappointsnewirsteam.html [https://perma.cc 
/9XV7-YMMH (describing Rossotti’s “effort to place the right people in the right jobs to help move . . . 
toward the creation of a new, taxpayer-focused IRS”). 
328 M. Alex Johnson, Republicans Seek to Impeach IRS Chief Over Alleged Tea Party Targeting, 
MSNBC (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/republicans-seek-impeach-irs-chief-over-alleged-
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/QFH4-KJRB] (also showing a photo of such an AirBnB ad, which states, “Dear Parking Enforcement, 
Please use the $12 million in hotel taxes to feed all the expired parking meters.  Love, Airbnb”).  Most 
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Experience has shown that if Congress finds IRS enforcement or service 
inadequate, it need not conclude that the IRS needs more resources—such as more 
personnel or better technology—to carry out that function.  Instead, Congress can 
discipline the IRS for perceived failures in service or enforcement by decreasing its 
funding.  The reduction in resources may also pose challenges for management, increasing 
the likelihood of mistakes.334  In other words, Congress can set a struggling IRS up for 
further failures. 
There are limited checks on Congress’s behavior toward the IRS: “The power of 
Congress to investigate the IRS is wide-ranging and may effectively be limited only by 
discretion and prudence.  Congress’s oversight entities possess an almost unwieldy power 
to inquire into, prod, and make suggestions to the Service.”335  Thus, Congress needs to 
exercise that power appropriately.  The U.S. Supreme Court has stated: 
Congress [is not] a law enforcement or trial agency.  These are functions 
of the executive and judicial departments of government.  No inquiry is an 
end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task 
of the Congress.  Investigations conducted solely for the personal 
aggrandizement of the investigators or to “punish” those investigated are 
indefensible.336 
Ultimately, if some politicians are disinclined to restrain themselves, the best hope 
for overall Congressional restraint may lie within the halls of Congress.  Although the IRS 
has few natural supporters,337 some in Congress no doubt support a progressive income tax 
or other aspects of our current federal tax system.  Congressional supporters of progressive 
taxation could link the IRS’s enforcement of the tax laws with a fight against increasing 
income inequality.338  That is, progressive taxation generally reduces income inequality, 
but if the tax system is not adequately enforced, the net effect may be to increase income 
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2016] IRS REFORM: POLITICS AS USUAL? 79 
inequality.339  If the IRS had vocal supporters within Congress, that might help temper the 
one-sidedness both the recent IRS hearings and those of the late 1990s evidenced. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The IRS, though central to the collection of the taxes that support our federal 
government,340 is unfortunately no stranger to controversy.  Allegations of wrongdoing by 
the IRS certainly warrant investigation.  TIGTA’s 2013 report, which launched the latest 
controversy, was the result of an investigation requested by Congress’s House Oversight 
Committee.  TIGTA made recommendations and it followed up with a subsequent 
investigation that found that the IRS was no longer delaying the applications of 501(c)(4) 
organizations.  The FBI and DOJ also investigated.  Like TIGTA, they found no politically 
motivated actions by the IRS.341 
By contrast, some in Congress seem to have political motivations for vilifying the 
IRS.  The nation’s experience with the 1998 IRS reform suggests that a moral panic over 
IRS employees’ behavior poses risks for tax administration, and particularly for 
enforcement of the tax laws. 
Allegations of IRS wrongdoing can also provide an excuse to cut the IRS’s budget.  
IRS resources are a critical issue, because, as Milka Casanegra de Jantscher and Richard 
Bird have pointed out, in the context of their work on tax administration in developing 
countries, three ingredients are necessary for effective tax administration: “the political 
will to implement the tax system effectively; a clear strategy as to how to achieve this goal; 
and adequate resources for the task at hand.”342  Lack of Congressional support threatens 
at least the first and third ingredients of this formula. 
Of course, how to keep Congress from treating the IRS as a political football is a 
very difficult problem.  It may help for supporters of progressive taxation to stand up to 
defend our nation’s tax collector against one-sided attacks.343  Regardless, reforming the 
IRS does not address an important and fundamental problem: Congress’s lack of support 
for enforcement of the tax laws it has legislated. 
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